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Suma´rio
Aplicando modelos de equilı´brio geral com concorreˆncia imperfeita, o objectivo desta tese e´
explicar de que forma os custos de transporte assime´tricos, os bens na˜o transacciona´veis e as
vantagens tecnolo´gicas regionais afectam a distribuic¸a˜o espacial da actividade econo´mica,
na presenc¸a de forc¸as de aglomerac¸a˜o.
No primeiro capı´tulo, generalizamos o modelo de Krugman (1991) incluindo custos de
transporte assime´tricos entre regio˜es e (assime´tricos) custos de transporte que sa˜o internos
a`s regio˜es.
No segundo capı´tulo, generalizamos o modelo de Krugman (1991) incluindo um paraˆmetro
para a percentagem de trabalhadores industriais na economia. No´s relaxamos a restric¸a˜o de
que a percentagem de trabalhadores industriais e´ igual a` percentagem da despesa em bens
industriais.
No terceiro capı´tulo, no´s generalizamos o modelo “core-periphery” resolvido analitica-
mente em Forslid e Ottaviano (2003), considerando um terceiro sector que produz bens
na˜o transacciona´veis (servic¸os).
No quarto capı´tulo, no´s generalizamos o modelo “core-periphery” resolvido analiticamente
em Forslid e Ottaviano (2003), incorporando uma vantagem tecnolo´gica para todas as
empresas que operam em uma das regio˜es. A vantagem tecnolo´gica consiste em considerar
uma regia˜o com um custo fixo mais baixo.
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Summary
Applying general equilibrium models with imperfect competition, the aim of this thesis
is to explain how asymmetric trade costs, non-tradable goods and regional technological
advantages affect the spatial distribution of the economic activity in the presence of
agglomeration economies.
In the first chapter, we generalize the model of Krugman (1991) to allow for asymmetric
trade costs between regions and for (asymmetric) trade costs that are internal to the regions.
In the second chapter, we generalize the model of Krugman (1991) including a parameter
for the share of industrial workers in the economy. Therefore, we relax the constraint that
the share of industrial workers in the economy and the share of spending in industrial goods
are the same.
In the third chapter, we generalize the analytically solvable core-periphery model of Forslid
and Ottaviano (2003) by considering a third sector, which produces non-tradable goods
(services).
In the fourth chapter, we generalize the analytically solvable core-periphery model of
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) incorporating a technology advantage for all industrial firms
operating in one of the regions. The technology advantage consists in modelling a region
with a lower fixed cost.
viii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The core periphery model with asymmetric inter-regional and intra-regional
trade costs 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Short-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Long-run Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Symmetric internal and external trade costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Asymmetric internal trade costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 Asymmetric external trade costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendices 33
CONTENTS
A Mathematical proofs 35
A.1 Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.2 Proof of lemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.2.1 Lemma 2.3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.2.2 Lemma 2.3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2.3 Lemma 2.3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.2.4 Lemma 2.3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.2.5 Lemma 2.3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.2.6 Lemma 2.3.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.3 Proof of propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.3.1 Proposition 2.3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.3.2 Proposition 2.3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.3.3 Proposition 2.3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.3.4 Proposition 2.3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.3.5 Proposition 2.3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3 The effect of population skills in the core-periphery model 57
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.1 Short-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
x
CONTENTS
3.2.2 Long-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.1 The spatial distribution of the economic activity . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.2 Welfare analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 A third sector in the core-periphery model:non-tradable goods 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.1 Basic setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.2 Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.3 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2.4 Short-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2.5 Long-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 The case in which services are non-tradable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.1 Short-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.2 Long-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4 The case in which services are tradable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Appendices 97
xi
CONTENTS
B Mathematical proofs 99
B.1 Short-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.2 Short-run equilibrium with τs → 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.3 Proof of claim 4.3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.4 Proof of lemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.4.1 Lemma 4.3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.4.2 Lemma 4.3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
B.4.3 Lemma 4.3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B.4.4 Lemma 4.3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
B.4.5 Lemma 4.3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
B.4.6 Lemma 4.3.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B.4.7 Lemma 4.3.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
B.4.8 Lemma 4.3.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B.4.9 Lemma 4.3.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5 The core-periphery model with technology advantage 117
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2.1 Basic setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2.2 Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
xii
CONTENTS
5.2.3 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2.4 Short-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.2.5 Long-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.1 Symmetric fixed costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.2 Asymmetric fixed costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Appendices 137
C Mathematical proofs 139
C.1 Short-run equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
C.2 Proof of propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
C.2.1 Proposition 5.4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
C.2.2 Proposition 5.4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
C.2.3 Proposition 5.4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
C.2.4 Proposition 5.4.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
C.2.5 Proposition 5.4.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Bibliography 151
xiii

List of Figures
2.1 Asymmetric internal and external trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 The spatial distribution of the economic activity with symmetric internal and
external trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Short-run equilibria and asymmetric internal trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Asymmetric dispersion with asymmetric internal trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Concentration with asymmetric internal trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Agglomeration in any region with asymmetric internal trade costs. . . . . . . . . 26
2.7 Agglomeration in only one region with asymmetric internal trade costs. . . . . . . 26
2.8 Liberalization is good. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.9 Liberalization is bad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.10 Asymmetric dispersion with asymmetric external trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.11 Concentration with asymmetric external trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.12 Agglomeration in any region with asymmetric external trade costs. . . . . . . . . 31
2.13 Agglomeration in only one region with asymmetric external trade costs. . . . . . 31
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Dispersion becomes unstable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Industrial location remains unchanged. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 The real wage in both regions for different values of M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 The optimal real regional income. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1 Possible equilibrium configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Concentration of industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 Concentration of services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4 Concentration of industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5 Asymmetric dispersion of services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.6 Dispersion of industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.7 Dispersion of services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.8 Dispersion becomes unstable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.9 Asymmetric dispersion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.10 Det(J) as a function of φm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.11 Threshold value for φm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.12 Industry becomes dispersed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.13 Concentration of services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.1 Asymmetric dispersion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2 Concentration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
xvi
LIST OF FIGURES
5.3 Asymmetric dispersion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4 Welfare in region 1 with a decrease in α1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5 Welfare in region 1 with an increase in α2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.6 Welfare in region 2 with a decrease in α1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.7 Welfare in region 2 with an increase in α2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.8 The welfare of the unskilled workers in region 1 when α1 decreases. . . . . . . . 134
5.9 The welfare of the unskilled workers in region 1 when α2 increases. . . . . . . . 134
5.10 The welfare of the unskilled workers in region 2 when α1 decreases. . . . . . . . 134
5.11 The welfare of the unskilled workers in region 2 when α2 increases. . . . . . . . 134
xvii

Chapter 1
Introduction
It is clear that at a macro level there appears a core-periphery structure where we observe
high disparities within the same country. Some regions agglomerate the highest share of
income and economic activity, while the other ones remain undeveloped and poor.
An identical spatial structure emerges at the global scale. For instance, in 2000, 83% of
the world GDP was concentrated in three regions (East Asia, EU, and NAFTA). In 1980,
the same regions concentrated about 70%. Hence, concentration of the world GDP in these
regions has been self-enforcing in the last years.
New economic geography explains this outcome using general equilibrium models with
imperfect competition, where firms produce goods under increasing returns to scale.
Considering perfect mobility of some factors of production, Krugman (1991), in a
seminal paper, shows that agglomeration is an endogenous result motivated by the balance
among three important effects, namely, “market access effect”, “cost-of-living effect” and
“crowding effect”.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The market access effect is represented by the idea that firms get large sales by operating
in a big market. Under increasing returns to scale, large sales make firms more profitable,
leading to the entry of new ones. This increases the production of new varieties at a lower
price causing a fall in the price index (cost-of-living effect), which in turn increases the real
income of the population. However, an increase in the number of firms and workers in a
region intensifies the competition (crowding effect). Hence, when the first two effects are
stronger than the last one, agglomeration is an optimal economic result.
Some key economic parameters change the balance between these forces. Indeed, trade
costs, the size of the industrial sector and the love for variety constitute the main explanatory
factors of agglomeration. Krugman (1991) shows that an economy characterized by low
trade costs, high love for variety and high spending in industrial products, will concentrate
all economic activity in one region.
Afterwards, the recent literature has provided an understanding of a variety of matters
in relation with the location of economic activity such as globalization and inequality of
the nations (Krugman and Venables, 1995), regional inequalities (Puga, 1999), economic
growth (Fujita and Thisse, 2003), economic development (Murata, 2008) and qualification
(Mori and Turrini, 2005; Toulemonde, 2006).
The paper of Krugman and Venables (1995) studies how the globalization process effects
the location of industry and gains from trade with immobility of labor. They show that the
long term decline in transportation costs, leading to growing integration of world markets
can produce first a division of the world into rich and poor regions, and then convergence
in income and economic structure between these regions. Simple geography models like
Krugman (1991) respond in a monotone way to declining transportation costs; when these
costs fall below a critical level, industry concentrates in one region. In an opposite way,
here, because labor is immobile (and thus wage differentials between regions emerge),
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continuing reductions in transportation costs eventually lead to a reindustrialization of the
low-wage region.
A closely related result is founded in Puga (1999). The paper studies the relationship
between the regional integration and regional differences in production structures and
income levels. He shows that when workers do not move across regions, at low trade
costs firms become increasingly sensitive to cost differentials leading industry to spread out
again. In this case it will be firms that move and this can bring about convergence both in
terms of industrial employment and of income.
Another contribution was made by Fujita and Thisse (2003). The authors study how the
rate of growth generated by innovations is related to the degree of spatial concentrations of
the activities. They show that when the economy moves from dispersion to agglomeration,
innovation follows a much faster pace. In fact the model strongly supports the idea that
agglomeration and growth reinforce each other.
Murata (2008) presents a model of structural change (without innovation) and
agglomeration. Unlike Krugman (1991) the author endogenizes not only the degree of
agglomeration, but also the expenditure and employment shares. He shows that a decline
in transportation costs, by enhancing consumers’ purchasing power shifts the demand from
agricultural to non-agricultural good and induces the reallocation of labor from agriculture
to non-agricultural activities. Thus, a substantial decline in transportation costs gives rise
to agglomeration of non-agricultural activities.
The qualification of the workers and the spatial distribution of economic activity are
mentioned in the models of Toulemonde (2006) and Mori and Turrini (2005). Toulemonde
(2006) elaborated a model of new economic geography in which the decision to invest in
skills acquisition depends on the demand for skills by firms from the industry sector. An
increase in the number of firms in one region induces more workers from that region to
3
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become skilled which in turn raises the demand for the goods produced by firms from the
industrial sector and reinforces the movement of firms to that region.
Mori and Turrini (2005) do not study the decision to invest in skills as Toulemonde (2006).
They show that when skill levels of agents are not equal, spatial sorting according to skill
levels arise as general phenomena. Agents with low skill may not be able to endure
the tough competition at large agglomerations, and may rather avoid these locations.
Conversely, since the highest skilled care less about competition, they will seek for the
locations where they can fully exploit agglomeration.
Despite the numerous contributions to understanding the location of economic activities in
space, some of limitations of the mainstream literature lies on its assumptions to capture
the reality. Frequently, it is assumed that: (i) trade costs are identical between and within
regions; (ii) the share of the industrial activity in the economy is equal to the share of
spending in industrial goods; (iii) the economy only comprises two sectors (an agricultural
and industrial sector) ignoring for instance, a non-tradable sector (service sector). It is
also always assumed that all firms have the same technology in the economy (see these
assumptions in Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 2001; Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
In reality, it is clear that trade costs are highly variable across regions, and the share of
spending in non-tradable goods is too high in the economy to be simply neglected by the
standard literature. Moreover, some regions are more competitive than others, where firms
share a technology advantage increasing the welfare of the population.
In this context, the main motivation behind this thesis is to provide new explanations for
the spatial distribution of the economic activity using new assumptions. Applying general
equilibrium models with imperfect competition, this research aims at investigating mainly
how asymmetric trade costs, non-tradable goods and regional technological advantages
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affect the spatial distribution of the economic activity in the presence of agglomeration
economies. We study the influence of each these aspects one at a time.
The thesis has of four additional chapters. The chapters are independent in the sense that
each chapter deals with a specific economic problem and, accordingly, its contribution can
be considered independently of the remaining thesis. The chapters are linked through the
theme of new economic geography.
In chapter 2, we generalize the model of Krugman (1991) to allow for asymmetric trade
costs between regions and for (asymmetric) trade costs that are internal to the regions.
In chapter 3, we generalize the model of Krugman (1991) including a specific parameter
for the share of industrial workers in the economy. Therefore, we relax the constraint that
the percentage of industrial workers and the share of spending in industrial goods are the
same.
In chapter 4, we generalize the core-periphery model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)
to allow for a third sector, specifically a non-tradable sector (or service sector). We
study how trade costs in the industrial sector and love for variety in the population affect
simultaneously the spatial location of industrial and service activity.
In chapter 5, we generalize the core-periphery model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) to
allow for a technology advantage in which all firms have lower fixed costs in one of the
regions.
Our study will be based on analytical solution of models together with simulations.
All numerical results in this thesis were obtained using MATLAB. Consistent with the
mainstream methodology in new economic geography, we develop general equilibrium
models capturing essential features of firms’ interaction, and consumers’ behavior in
imperfectly competitive sectors.
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Our method comprehends the following stages:
(i) Set up the model: In this stage we introduce the new assumption into standard core-
periphery models so as to provide a suitable model for our economics concerns.
(ii) Equilibrium: In this stage, we rely on an analytical approach complemented by
simulations to identify and to characterize the equilibrium. Depending on the nature of
the model in the first stage, we might seek for different types of equilibrium, namely
concentration, symmetric and asymmetric dispersion equilibrium;
(iii) Economic analysis: At this stage, we investigate the implications of the equilibrium
characterized in the second stage. We point out the differences and similarities between our
model and the standard one.
The technical proofs are all presented in appendices to each chapter.
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Chapter 2
The core periphery model with asymmetric
inter-regional and intra-regional trade costs
? The results in this chapter have been published as Leite at al.(2009a) and also appeared as a working paper (Leite et al., 2008).
CHAPTER 2. THE CORE PERIPHERY MODEL WITH ASYMMETRIC
INTER-REGIONAL AND INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE COSTS
2.1 Introduction
What is the impact of asymmetric internal and external trade costs on the spatial distribution
of the industrial activity and on the welfare of the different interest groups in an economy?
Trade costs, broadly defined by Anderson and Wincoop (2004):
“include all costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other than the marginal cost of
producing the good itself: transportation costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy
barriers (tariffs and nontariff barriers), information costs, contract enforcement costs,
costs associated with the use of different currencies, legal and regulatory costs, and local
distribution costs (wholesale and retail).”
It is clear that trade costs are highly variable across countries. They are higher in landlocked
countries than in coastal countries (Lima˜o and Venables, 2001) and higher in developing
countries than in industrialized countries (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). Differences in
trade costs, particularly those associated with the distance to the larger markets, explain
some of the income inequality across countries (Redding and Venables, 2004).
The economic relevance of trade costs is beyond doubt, being equivalent (in industrialized
countries) to a 170 % ad valorem tax equivalent, that can be decomposed into a 55%
domestic trade cost, associated with local distribution, and a 74 % international trade cost
(Anderson and Wincoop, 2004).
A monotonic relationship between trade costs and location of the economic activity is one
of the main theoretical findings of the ‘New Economic Geography’ literature. If trade costs
are high, economic activity is dispersed across regions, while if trade costs are low, then
economic activity becomes concentrated in one region.1
1The concept of “region” may refer to locations ranging from small geographical regions like cities (Fujita
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This recent literature has allowed an understanding of a variety of matters in its relation with
the location of economic activity such as trade policy (Baldwin et al., 2003), economic
development (Murata, 2002), qualification (Mori and Turrini, 2005; Toulemonde, 2006),
quality of the infrastructure (Martin and Rogers, 1995) and the structure of the transport
network (Fujita and Mori, 1996; Mun, 2004). A welfare analysis of the agglomeration
process was carried out by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002).
In spite of the empirical evidence, most of the theoretical work has neglected the differences
in trade costs across regions and the trade costs that are internal to a region, focusing on the
case of symmetric trade costs associated with trade across regions.2
In this paper, we extend the model introduced by Krugman (1991) to allow for: (i) the
existence of intra-regional (internal) trade costs, possibly different between regions; and
(ii) the existence of asymmetric inter-regional (external) trade costs.
By asymmetric external trade costs we mean that the cost of trading from region 1 to region
2 is different from the cost of trading from region 2 to region 1. The assumption that trade
costs from region 1 to region 2 are identical to those from region 2 to region 1 is pervasive
in the existing literature. Nevertheless, it is clear that some trade barriers like tariffs and
import quotas are unilateral (at least asymmetric) and that there may be different degrees
of trade liberalization.3 This asymmetry was illustrated by Krugman and Venables (1995,
Section V) in the form of a unilateral import tariff.
and Krugman, 1995; Mori, 1997) to larger areas such as countries or even continents (Krugman and Venables,
1995).
2See, for example, the works of Krugman (1991), Fujita and Krugman (1995), Mori (1997), Ottaviano
and Puga (1998), Puga (1999), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001), Baldwin et al. (2003), Ottaviano and
Thisse (2004) and the references therein.
3See Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview on trade policy and economic geography.
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There are papers that consider internal and external trade costs in new economic geography
models, but none addressing the problem of extending the base model of Krugman (1991).
Martin and Rogers (1995) have considered asymmetric internal and external transportation
costs in an economy with two countries, but in their model workers are immobile between
regions. Therefore, it does not capture agglomeration as a self-reinforcing process
generated by demand-linkage and cost-linkage circular causality.4
A kind of internal and external transportation costs also appears in Mansori (2003), who
considers a country composed by two identical regions which trade with the rest of the
world. Each region has a different cost of trading with the rest of the world, and there is
also trade between the two regions.
Behrens et al. (2007) proposed a model in which there are two identical countries formed by
two regions between which labor is mobile, while there is no international labor mobility.
Goods can be traded both nationally and internationally at different costs. Particularly, they
assume that countries have different internal trade costs, but still an identical external trade
cost.
In sum, we study an economy in which there are agglomeration forces generated by the
mobility of the industrial population, allowing for asymmetric internal and external trade
costs. Technically, we extend Krugman’s (1991) model to accommodate four different trade
costs: external trade costs from region 1 to region 2 and from 2 to 1, and internal trade costs
4When workers migrate to a region, the size of the market increases, fostering economic activity in this
region (demand-linkage). When economic activity is transfered to a region, trade costs in this region decrease,
attracting workers (cost-linkage). See Baldwin et al. (2003) for a detailed explanation of the difference
between the basic core-periphery model (Krugman, 1991) and the footloose captal model (Martin and Rogers,
1995).
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within region 1 and within region 2.5
We show that in the case of symmetric trade costs, the model is equivalent to the original
model of Krugman (1991) with trade cost equal to the ratio between the external and
the internal trade cost. The trade cost considered in the existing literature can, thus, be
interpreted as the ratio between external and internal trade costs. Recall that this ratio was
measured as a 74% tax by Anderson and Wincoop (2004).6 The measures of the total
trade cost as a 170% tax and of the domestic component as a 55% tax are irrelevant for the
agglomeration process.
Not surprisingly, we find that industrial activity tends to shift to the region with lower
internal trade costs, and to the region with higher cost of importing (lower cost of
exporting).
Considering a decrease of the internal trade cost of a region, we find that, in this region,
the real wages of the workers increase in the short-run, and economic activity increases in
the long-run (workers migrate to the region). In terms of welfare, we observe a “win-lose”
situation. In the short-run, the welfare of workers improves in this region but worsens in
the other region, while the welfare of farmers improves in both regions (because prices go
down).
In the case of a unilateral decrease in the cost of importing, there are different possible
effects. If the size of the industrial sector is small, the real wages of the workers decrease
in the short-run and economic activity decreases in the long-run. If the industrial sector is
large, we arrive at the opposite conclusion. The real wages of the other regions’ workers
5We do not address the issue of assigning trade costs to agricultural goods. See Fujita, Krugman and
Venables (2001, chapter 7).
6A tax of 74% corresponds to an iceberg cost parameter of 0.57 = 1/1.74. To receive 1 unit, the customer
pays 1.74.
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always increases. The welfare of farmers always improves in the region, and worsens in the
other region.
In the next section we present an extension of the model of Krugman (1991) which
accommodates different internal and external trade costs. Section 2.3 includes the main
results, being divided into three subsections which corresponds to the cases of symmetric
trade costs, asymmetric internal trade costs, and asymmetric external trade costs. Section
2.4 concludes the chapter with some remarks. Proofs of the analytical results can be found
in the appendixes.
2.2 The model
The economy comprises two sectors (agriculture and industry) and two regions (1 and 2).
Regions are symmetric in terms of technology and preferences, but may have different
internal and external trade costs.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale, using only labor supplied by farmers, who are immobile between
regions.
The manufacturing sector is monopolistic competitive and produces a continuum of
varieties of a horizontally differentiated product using only labor supplied by workers, who
are mobile between regions.
Both farmers and workers share a utility function of the form
U = CµMC
1−µ
A , (2.1)
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where CA is consumption of the agricultural goods and CM is consumption of a
manufactures aggregate. This functional form implies that 0 < µ < 1 is the share of
spending on manufactured goods.
The manufacturing firms produce horizontally differentiated products, with the
manufactures aggregate being defined as:
CM =
[∫ N
0
c
(σ−1)/σ
i di
]σ/(σ−1)
,
where N is the quantity of horizontally differentiated products, ci is the consumption of the
i differentiated product and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among the products. A
low σ means that the products have a high degree of differentiation (or that the consumers
have a high preference for variety).
A fraction 0 < µ < 1 of the population works in the manufacturing sector, while the
remaining, 1− µ, works in the agricultural sector.7 Farmers are evenly distributed between
the regions, thus the agricultural population in each region is fixed and equal to 1−µ
2
.
The industrial population in regions 1 and 2 is L1 and L2, with L1 +L2 = µ. We denote the
share of workers in region 1 by f = L1
L1+L2
(the share of workers in region 2 is, obviously,
1− f ).
Production of each variety requires a fixed input involving α > 0 units of labor and a
variable input involving β > 0 units of labor, supplied by the industrial workers. The cost
function, in region j, is:
CTj = Wj(α + βxi),
7The coincidence between the share of population in each sector and the share of spending on each sector
only implies the equality between wages in both sectors, in equilibrium.
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where CTj is the cost to produce one unit of some variety, Wj is the nominal wage of the
workers in region j, and xi is the output produced by the firm.
Given the profit-maximization pricing behavior of manufacturing firms that operate in a
monopolistic competitive sector, the price of any manufactured product in region j is:
pj =
σ
σ − 1βWj.
Free entry of firms into the manufacturing sector drives profits to zero, which implies that
all firms produce the same output, given by:
xi =
α(σ − 1)
β
.
Each firm employs the same number of workers, therefore:
L1
L2
=
n1
n2
,
where nj is the number of firms in region j.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and has constant returns to scale. One unit
of labor supplied by farmers is used to produce one unit of the agricultural good. Trade
costs in this sector are neglected, therefore, the price of the agricultural good is the same in
both regions, and chosen as the numeraire.
pA = WA = 1,
where pA is the price of the agricultural good and WA is the nominal wage of the farmers
in both regions.
So far, we have presented the model of Krugman (1991). We now extend it by allowing for
the existence of asymmetric trade costs between regions as well as different internal trade
costs.
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The trade of manufactures involves an iceberg trade cost. Of each unit of manufactures
shipped from region i to region j, only a fraction 0 < τij < 1 arrives. Thus, a high
τij corresponds to a low trade cost. The trade of agricultural products is assumed to be
costless.8
Figure 2.1: Asymmetric internal and external trade costs.
Figure 2.1 represents the configuration of the economy with two regions and four different
trade costs. The parameter τ12 represents the cost of shipping the manufactured goods from
region 1 to region 2, while τ21 represents the cost necessary to ship the manufactured goods
from region 2 to region 1. We designate these as external trade costs. We also consider
trade costs for goods that are produced and consumed in the same region, τ11 and τ22, and
designate them as internal trade costs. We assume that the internal trade costs are lower
than the external trade costs.
2.2.1 Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run, the spatial distribution of workers is taken as given (migrations do not
occur). We start by computing output and nominal wages. After we compute prices and
8This assumption was relaxed by Adrian (1996). Agricultural transport costs were shown to render
agglomeration of industry less likely.
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check whether there are incentives for workers to migrate by comparing the real wages in
each region.
We denote consumption in region i of a representative region j product by Cji.
In region 1, the price of a local product is p1/τ11, while the price of an imported product is
p2/τ21. Consumption is given by:
C11 =
(
p1
τ11
)−σ
and C21 =
(
p2
τ21
)−σ
.
The expenditure on local manufactures, E11, and on foreign manufactures, E21, is:
E11 =
(
p1
τ11
)1−σ
n1 and E21 =
(
p2
τ21
)1−σ
n2.
Given E11 and E21, we define Z11 as the ratio between region 1’s expenditure on local
manufactures and region 1’s expenditure on manufactures imported from region 2:
Z11 =
E11
E21
=
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
n1
n2
=
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
. (2.2)
With a similar procedure we obtain Z12, the ratio between region 2’s spending on region 1
products and local products:
Z12 =
E12
E22
=
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
. (2.3)
Let Y1 and Y2 denote the nominal regional income, which is equal to the sum of the incomes
in the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors:
Y1 =
1− µ
2
+W1L1 and Y2 =
1− µ
2
+W2L2. (2.4)
The nominal wage of workers in region 1 is equal to the spending on region 1’s
manufactures:
L1W1 =
Z11
1 + Z11
µY1 +
Z12
1 + Z12
µY2 ⇔ W1 = µ
L1
[
Z11
1 + Z11
Y1 +
Z12
1 + Z12
Y2
]
. (2.5)
16
2.2. THE MODEL
Similarly, the nominal wage of workers in region 2 is:
W2 =
µ
L2
[
1
1 + Z11
Y1 +
1
1 + Z12
Y2
]
. (2.6)
Expressions (2.4)-(2.6) imply that the sum of the nominal wages across all agents is
invariant:
L1W1 + L2W2 = µ. (2.7)
Equations (2.2)-(2.4) allow us to write (2.5) and (2.6) in the following way:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ
2
+W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ
2
+W2L2)
1 +
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
 ; (2.8)
W2 =
µ
L2
 1−µ2 +W1L1
1 +
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
1−µ
2
+W2L2
1 +
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
 . (2.9)
Equations (2.8) and (2.9) constitute a system that determines W1 and W2 for a given
distribution of workers between regions 1 and 2. Using (2.7), equation (2.8) can be written
as a function of W1 and equation (2.9) can be written as a function of W2.
Workers are interested not in nominal wages but in real wages, and these depend on the cost
of living in each region.
The price indices, P1 and P2, reflect the relationship between expenditure and utility for
individuals in region 1 and region 2, respectively. These depend on the price of the
agricultural products (normalized to 1) as well as on the price indices of manufactured
goods, PM1 and PM2.
PM1 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ21
)1−σ] 11−σ
;
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PM2 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ22
)1−σ] 11−σ
,
where f = L1
L1+L2
and γ = σβ
σ−1
[
µ
α
β
(σ−1)
] 1
1−σ
.
We have P1 = P
1−µ
A P
µ
M1 = P
µ
M1 and P2 = P
1−µ
A P
µ
M2 = P
µ
M2. Therefore:
P1 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ21
)1−σ]− µσ−1
; (2.10)
P2 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ22
)1−σ]− µσ−1
. (2.11)
The maximization of (2.1) yields consumption of each product (manufacture aggregate and
agricultural good), and given the price index of each of them, we obtain the utility in region
i for workers, UMi , and farmers, U
A
i :
UMi = µ
µ(1− µ)1−µWi
Pi
and UAi = µ
µ(1− µ)1−µ 1
Pi
. (2.12)
Workers seek the region with the highest utility or, equivalently, the highest real wage.
From equations (2.8), (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11), we obtain the relative real wage, ω1/ω2:
ω1
ω2
=
W1
P1
W2
P2
=
W1
[
f
(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ22
)1−σ] µ1−σ
W2
[
f
(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ21
)1−σ] µ1−σ .
2.2.2 Long-run Equilibrium
The short-run equilibrium variables are determined taking as given the amount of industrial
workers in each region, f . The long-run equilibrium is a situation where migration does
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not occur. We say that it is stable if it is robust to small perturbations of the distribution of
workers across regions.
Dispersion is a long-run equilibrium configuration if regions have the same real wage. It is
stable if a small migration to region 1 decreases the real wage in region 1, implying that the
initial configuration is reestablished. Precisely:
ω1
ω2
|f=f∗ = 1 and
[
∂
(
w1
w2
)
/∂f
]
|f=f∗ < 0.
If the equilibrium share of population in region 1 is 0.5 (f ∗ = 0.5), we say that dispersion
is symmetric (otherwise, it is asymmetric).
Concentration is a long-run equilibrium configuration if all workers are concentrated in the
region that has the highest real wage. Unless real wages exactly coincide, it is stable.
f ∗ = 1 and
ω1
ω2
|f=f∗ ≥ 1 (concentration in region 1).
f ∗ = 0 and
ω1
ω2
|f=f∗ ≤ 1 (concentration in region 2).
2.3 Results
In this section, we consider three different cases.
1. Symmetric internal and external trade costs: (τ12 = τ21 = τe and τ11 = τ22 = τi).
2. Asymmetric internal trade costs: (τ12 = τ21 = τe and τ11 6= τ22).
3. Asymmetric external trade costs: (τ12 6= τ21 and τ11 = τ22 = τi).
We provide analytical results for short-run equilibria and simulations describing the long-
run behavior.
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2.3.1 Symmetric internal and external trade costs
Suppose that regions have equal internal trade costs, τ11 = τ22 = τi, and symmetric external
trade costs, τ12 = τ21 = τe.
In a short-run equilibrium, the relative real wage, ω1
ω2
, is the same as in the model of
Krugman (1991), with τ = τe
τi
.9 In this sense, we can reinterpret the trade cost in the
model of Krugman (1991) as a ratio between external and internal trade costs.
Proposition 2.3.1. When regions have equal internal trade costs, τ11 = τ22 = τi, and equal
external trade costs, τ21 = τ12 = τe, the ratio between ω1 and ω2 is the same as in the case
in which regions have only an external trade cost equal to τ = τe
τi
.
The proof of this result is provided in the appendix.
Figure 2.210 illustrates the effect of a decrease of internal trade costs on the relative real
wage (external trade costs are kept constant).
The bold line in figure 2.2 corresponds to short-run equilibria (f, ω1
ω2
) in which there are no
internal trade costs (τi = 1) while the external trade costs are equal to 0.5 (the ratio between
external and internal trade costs is τ = τe
τi
= 0.5). Any combination between internal and
external trade costs such that τe
τi
= 0.5 leads to the same relative real wage (Proposition
2.3.1), and therefore to the same spatial distribution of economic activity.
The dotted line corresponds to short-run equilibria in which the internal trade costs are 2/3
and the external trade costs are 0.5. In this case, the ratio between the external an internal
trade costs is τ = τe
τi
= 0.75.
9Recall that the model of Krugman (1991) only considers the external trade cost.
10To plot this figure, we have set τe = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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Figure 2.2: The spatial distribution of the economic activity with symmetric internal and external
trade costs.
When the ratio between the internal and external trade costs changes, there is a change in the
short-run equilibria. In this example, the decrease of internal trade costs (from τi = 2/3 to
τi = 1) changes the equilibrium configuration from agglomeration to symmetric dispersion.
2.3.2 Asymmetric internal trade costs
What is the impact of a unilateral decrease in the internal trade costs:
• On the relative real wage, in the short-run?
• On the welfare of each interest group, in the short-run?
• On the distribution of industrial activity, in the long-run?
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We provide analytical results for the first two questions, and use simulation to characterize
the distribution of economic activity in the long-run. Proofs can be found in the appendix.
For the analytical results, we have chosen parameter values such that the initial long-run
equilibrium is characterized by symmetric dispersion of economic activity. We start out
with regions that have symmetric trade costs (τ12 = τ21 = τe and τ11 = τ22 = τi) and we
consider a marginal decrease of the internal trade cost of region 2 (an increase in τ22).11
Short-run effect on the relative real wage
Figure 2.312 compares short-run equilibria in the symmetric case (τ22 = τ11) with short-
run equilibria when region 2 has lower internal trade costs (i.e. τ22 > τ11). Of course
that, starting from a symmetric setting, analogous results are obtained for τ11 > τ22,
by interchanging the regions. The curve which depicts the short-run equilibria moves
downwards, which means that workers in region 2 will have a higher real wage than workers
in region 1, in the short-run. In particular, for f = 0.5, the relative real wage in region 1,
ω1
ω2
, is a decreasing function of τ22, and the economy moves from point A to point B.
According to proposition 2.3.2, and considering as a starting point a symmetric dispersion
equilibrium in which τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ22 = τ11 = τi, this outcome occurs for any value
of σ and µ.
Proposition 2.3.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. The relative real wage,
ω1
ω2
, is a decreasing function of τ22, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Short-run effect on the welfare of the four interest groups
11Recall that, for each unit produced and sold in region 2, a fraction τ22 is consumed, while 1 − τ22 is
dissipated as trade costs.
12To plot this figure, we have set τe = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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Figure 2.3: Short-run equilibria and asymmetric internal trade costs.
There are four interest groups in this economy, namely, the workers and the farmers in each
region. Here we analyze the effect of variations of τ22 on the utility, (2.12), of each interest
group.
Notice that the utility of the workers coincides with the real wage, except for the constant
term, µµ(1− µ)1−µ.
The decrease of the internal trade costs in region 2, (increase in τ22) influences the nominal
wages and the price index in both regions, causing a “win-lose” outcome in which the
workers in region 1 are the losers (Lemma 2.3.1), while the workers in region 2 are the
winners (Lemma 2.3.2).
Lemma 2.3.1. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage in region 1,
ω1, is a decreasing function of τ22, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
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Lemma 2.3.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage in region 2,
ω2, is an increasing function of τ22, for 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
As the nominal wages of the farmers are always equal to 1, their real wages only depend
on the price index. Therefore, all welfare effects stem from the cost-of-living effect. We
show in Lemma 2.3.3 and Lemma 2.3.4 that the price indices in both regions are decreasing
functions of τ22.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The price index in region
1, P1, is a decreasing function of τ22 for 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Lemma 2.3.4. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2, the price index in region 2,
P2, is a decreasing function of τ22 for 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
In the short-run, a decrease in the internal trade costs of one region benefits the farmers in
both regions.
Long-run effect on the distribution of industrial activity
Figures 2.413 and 2.514 illustrate the possible effects of a decrease in the internal trade costs
of region 2. In the long-run, the economic activity can be asymmetrically dispersed between
regions (figure 2.4) or fully concentrated in region 2 (figure 2.5).
Point A represents the initial long-run equilibrium (in which regions have symmetric
internal and external trade costs). Industrial activity is equally divided between the regions
(L1 = L2 ⇔ f = 0.5). The real wages are obviously identical in both regions (otherwise
there would exist incentives for the workers to move to the region with higher real wages).
13To plot this figure, we have set τe = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
14To plot this figure, we have set τe = 0.4, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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Figure 2.4: Asymmetric dispersion with
asymmetric internal trade costs.
Figure 2.5: Concentration with asymmetric
internal trade costs.
However, when τ22 > τ11, the economy finds a new short-run equilibrium, point B, in which
ω2 > ω1.
This attracts workers from region 1. There is migration to region 2 until the real wages
coincide (figure 2.4) or until all workers have migrated to region 2 (figure 2.5).
Figure 2.4 shows an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium (point C) with f ∗ < 0.5 and
ω1 = ω2, while figure 2.5 shows a concentration equilibrium (point C) with f ∗ = 0 and
ω2 > ω1.
If economic activity is initially concentrated in a region, then a variation of internal trade
costs may preserve this configuration (figure 2.6), or may imply that concentration can only
occur in the region with the lower internal trade costs (figure 2.7)15.
An increase in τ22 favors concentration in region 2, as the basin of attraction is enlarged.
Indeed, for τ22 = 0.97 and τ11 = 0.95, we observe from figure 2.6, that any f < 0.6 (point
C) is sufficient to induce concentration in region 2.
15To plot these figures, we have set τe = 0.75, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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Figure 2.6: Agglomeration in any region with
asymmetric internal trade costs.
Figure 2.7: Agglomeration in only one region
with asymmetric internal trade costs.
In figure 2.7, we illustrate a case in which all industrial activity is initially concentrated in
region 1, with f = 1 and ω1 > ω2 (point A) and consider a decrease in the internal trade
costs in region 2 (an increase in τ22). If the new relative real wage is above 1, the decrease
in the internal trade costs in region 2 will have no effect on the spatial distribution of the
industrial activity. But if the new relative real wage is below 1 (point B), then the impact
on the location of the industry is drastic. In our illustration, for a τ22 = 1.1τ11, all industrial
activity relocates from region 1 to region 2 (point C with f = 0 and ω2 > ω1).
2.3.3 Asymmetric external trade costs
What is the impact of an asymmetry between the cost of exporting and the cost of importing:
• On the relative real wage, in the short-run?
• On the welfare of each interest group, in the short-run?
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• On the distribution of industrial activity, in the long-run?
We provide analytical results for the first two questions, and we use numerical methods to
characterize the distribution of economic activity in the long-run. The proofs may be found
on the appendix.
For the analytical results, we focus on the case in which the initial long-run equilibrium is
characterized by symmetric dispersion of economic activity and we suppose that regions
have initially symmetric trade costs, τ12 = τ21 = τe and τ11 = τ22 = τi. Then, we consider
a marginal decrease of the cost of trading goods from region 1 to region 2 (τ12 > τ21),
keeping constant the cost of trading goods from region 2 to region 1 (τ21). We may interpret
τ12 > τ21 as the case in which region 2 has a lower cost of importing.16
We study the two types of long-run equilibrium: dispersion and concentration.
Short-run effect on the relative real wage
Figures 2.817 and 2.918 show the impact of a decrease in cost of trade from region 1 to
region 2 (increase in τ12) on the relative real wage, in the short-run (starting from a initial
dispersion that is unstable and stable, respectively).
In the case illustrated in figure 2.8, the relative real wage of region 1 decreases (from point
A to B), while figure 2.9 shows the opposite effect. The direction of the effect depends on
the weight of the industrial sector in the economy.
16The trade costs from region 1 to region 2, τ12, are supported by consumers in region 2. As p1 is the
price of the manufactured products produced in region 1 (determined in the market), then p1τ12 is the total price
supported by consumers in region 2 when they purchase a manufacture produced in region 1. Then, if τ12
increases, the price paid by consumers in region 2 decreases.
17To plot this figure, we have set τi = 0.95, µ = 0.96 and σ = 4.
18To plot this figure, we have set τi = 0.95, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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Figure 2.8: Liberalization is good. Figure 2.9: Liberalization is bad.
Proposition 2.3.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. There is a
µ∗(σ, τ) ∈ (0, 1) such that: d(ω1/ω2)
dτ12
> 0 for µ ∈ (0, µ∗) and d(ω1/ω2)
dτ12
< 0 for µ ∈ (µ∗, 1).
Short-run effect on the welfare of each interest group
The four interest groups are the workers and the farmers in each of the regions. The utilities
(2.12) coincide with the real wages, except for a constant. Therefore, we study the impact
of τ12 on the real wages of each group.
We show that a decrease in cost of trade from region 1 to region 2 (an increase in τ12)
increases the welfare of workers in region 1 (Proposition 2.3.4), whereas the effect on the
welfare of workers in region 2 can be positive or negative (Proposition 2.3.5).
Proposition 2.3.4. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage in
region 1, ω1, is an increasing function of τ12, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
Proposition 2.3.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. For any
0 < τe < τi < 1, there is a µ∗(σ, τ) ∈ (0, 1) such that: dω2dτ12 < 0 for µ ∈ (0, µ∗) and
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dω2
dτ12
> 0 for µ ∈ (µ∗, 1).
As the nominal wages of the farmers are always equal to 1, their real wages only depend on
the price index. We show that the price index in region 1, P1, is an increasing function of
τ12 (Lemma 2.3.5) and that the price index in region 2, P2, is a decreasing function of τ12
(Lemma 2.3.6). This means that a decrease in the cost of trading manufactured goods from
region 1 to region 2 (an increase in τ12) benefits the farmers of region 2 and penalizes the
farmers of region 1.
Lemma 2.3.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, P1 is an increasing
function of τ12 for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Lemma 2.3.6. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, P2 is a decreasing
function of τ12 for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Long-run effect on the distribution of industrial activity
Figures 2.10 and 2.1119 depict the long-run distribution of industrial activity. Depending
on the extent of the asymmetry of external trade costs, the economic activity can be
asymmetrically distributed between regions or fully concentrated in one region.
In figure 2.10, we present an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium. An increase in τ12
increases the relative real wage in region 1 attracting new workers to the region. The
migration to region 1 leads to a decrease in ω1/ω2. This process continues until a new
long-run equilibrium is reached, point C, with ω1 = ω2.
Figure 2.11 illustrates how a strong increase in τ12 may generate catastrophic agglomeration
in region 1, producing a core-periphery structure (point C).
19To plot these figures, we have set τi = 0.95, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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Figure 2.10: Asymmetric dispersion with
asymmetric external trade costs.
Figure 2.11: Concentration with asymmetric
external trade costs.
Figures 2.12 and 2.1320 describe the case in which there is an initial concentration of
economic activity. Figure 2.12 deals with a case in which concentration may occur in
any of the regions, while figure 2.13 shows a case in which all economic activity becomes
concentrated in region 2.
Figure 2.12 shows that an increase in τ12 enlarges the basin of attraction of the equilibrium
in which all economic activity is concentrated in region 1.
Figure 2.13 illustrates an environment in which region 2 initially concentrates all industrial
activity (point A, with f = 0 and ω2 > ω1). An increase in τ12 raises the relative real
wage in region 1, in the short-run (point B). As the real wage is higher in region 1, workers
migrate from region 2 to region 1. In the long-run, there is full agglomeration in region 1
(point C).
There is a threshold degree of asymmetric trade liberalization between regions that
generates the relocation of all industrial activity from one region to the other. However,
20To plot these figures, we have set τi = 0.95, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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Figure 2.12: Agglomeration in any region
with asymmetric external trade costs.
Figure 2.13: Agglomeration in only one
region with asymmetric external trade costs.
there will be no migration of workers until the the asymmetry in trade liberalization reaches
this threshold.
2.4 Concluding remarks
We have extended the model of Krugman (1991) in order to study the effects of internal
and external trade costs on the location of industrial activity as well as on the welfare of the
agents. The existence of an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium is not surprising, given that
under distinct trade costs, the regions no longer are identical.
We find that industrial activity in a region is enhanced, ceteris paribus, by lower internal
trade costs and by higher costs of importing (lower costs of exporting). The fact that
asymmetries in the external trade costs lead to relocation of economic activity is a natural
result. However, it was not present in the work of Martin and Rogers (1995). In their
model, differentials in external trade costs only increase the sensitivity of industrial location
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to differentials in the internal trade costs.21
From the point of view of welfare, a decrease of the internal trade cost of a region benefits
the workers of this region and the farmers of both regions, while the workers of the other
region become worse off.
A decrease in the cost of trading from region 1 to region 2 benefits the workers of region
1 and the farmers of region 2, while the farmers of region 1 become worse off. The effect
on the welfare of the workers of region 2 is positive if the weight of the industrial sector is
large, and negative otherwise.
The analytical results obtained for short-run equilibria support the numerical evidence
obtained for the long-run. In the long-run, numerical results indicate a new feature, namely
that of sudden agglomeration in some instances.
21If internal trade costs are equal, then differentials in external trade costs have no effect.
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Appendix A
Mathematical proofs
A.1 Claims
Claim A.1.1. If L1 = L2, then W1 +W2 = 2.
When L1 = L2, τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ22 = τ11 = τi, then W1 = W2 = 1.
Proof. Substituting L1 = L2 = mu2 in (2.7), we obtain W1 +W2 = 2.
If the trade costs are symmetric (τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ22 = τ11 = τi), then W1 = W2 = 1 is a
short-run equilibrium, as we verify below.
The nominal wage in region 1 is:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W2L2)
1 +
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
 .
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Substituting W1 = W2 = 1, L1 = L2 = µ2 , τe = τ12 = τ21 and τi = τ11 = τ22, we obtain:
1 = 2

(
τe
τi
)1−σ
1−µ+µ
2
1 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
1−µ+µ
2
1 +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
⇔
1 =

(
τe
τi
)1−σ
1 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
1 +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
⇔
1 =
2 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ
+
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
2 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ
+
(
τe
τi
)σ−1 ⇔
1 = 1.
This short-run equilibrium is unique (Mossay, 2006).
Claim A.1.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi, and L1 = L2. Then, P1 = P2 ≥ 1.
Proof. Substituting W1 = W2 = 1, τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and f = 12 into (2.10) and
(2.11), we obtain:
P1 =
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
2
)µ/(1−σ)
,
and
P2 =
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
2
)µ/(1−σ)
.
We verify that P1 = P2, and since τi and τe are greater or equal than 1, P1 = P2 ≥ 1.
36
A.1. CLAIMS
Claim A.1.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, 0 < ω1 = ω2 ≤ 1.
Proof. The real wage is simply given by the ratio between nominal wage (W1 = W2 = 1) and the
price index (P1 = P2 ≥ 1).
ω1 = ω2 =
1
P1
=
1
P2
=
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
2
)µ/(σ−1)
.
We clearly have 0 < ω1 = ω2 ≤ 1.
Claim A.1.4. Let L1 = L2. In the short-run:
dW1
dτi
= −dW2
dτi
,
dW1
dτe
= −dW2
dτe
and
dW1
dτ22
= −dW2
dτ22
.
Proof. This is a straightforward consequence of W1 +W2 = 2.
Claim A.1.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi = 1 and L1 = L2. An increase in τ22 decreases
W1, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. We want to prove that
dW2
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
> 0.
By Claim A.1.1, we can substitute W1 = 2−W2 in equation (2.9).
W2
2
=
1−µ
2 + (2−W2)µ2
1 +
(
(2−W2)τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ + 1−µ2 + W2µ2
1 +
(
(2−W2)τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ = AB + CD. (A.1)
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We compute dW2dτ22 (denoted, below, as W
′
2) by implicit differentiation, substituting W2 = 1,
τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ11 = τ22 = τi = 1.
W ′2
2
=
A′
B
− B
′A
B2
+
C ′
D
− D
′C
D2
,
where
A = C =
1
2
, A′ = −µ
2
W ′2, C
′ =
µ
2
W ′2, B = 1 + τ
1−σ, D = 1 + τσ−1,
B′ = 2(σ − 1)τ1−σW ′2, D′ = 2(σ − 1)τσ−1
(
W ′2 −
1
2τi
)
.
With some manipulation:
W ′2
2 = −
µ
2W
′
2
1 + τ1−σ
+
µ
2W
′
2
1 + τσ−1
− (σ − 1)τ
1−σW ′2
(1 + τ1−σ)2
−
(σ − 1)τσ−1
(
W ′2 − 12τi
)
(1 + τσ−1)2
⇔
⇔ W ′2
[
1 +
µ
1 + τ1−σ
− µ
1 + τσ−1
+
(σ − 1)τ1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
]
=
(σ − 1)τσ−1
2τi (1 + τσ−1)2
.
Using the fact that τ
1−σ
(1+τ1−σ)2
= τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
:
W ′2 =
(σ−1)τσ−1
2τi(1+τσ−1)2
1 + µ
1+τ1−σ − µ1+τσ−1 + 2(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
. (A.2)
It should be clear that W ′2 =
dW2
dτ22
is positive. Then, from Claim (A.1.4), we know that dW1dτ22 is
negative.
Claim A.1.6. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi = and L1 = L2. An increase in τ12 increases
W1, for any τi ∈ (0, 1) τe ∈ (0, τi), µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
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Proof. From Claim A.1.4, we know that
dW2
dτ12
= −dW1
dτ12
. Denote
dW2
dτ12
by W ′2.
Recalling (A.1):
W2
2
=
1−µ
2 +
µ
2 (2−W2)
1 +
(
2−W2
W2
τ21
τ11
)1−σ + 1−µ2 + µ2W2
1 +
(
2−W2
W2
τ22
τ12
)1−σ = AB + CD.
Then:
W ′2
2
=
−µ2W ′2B − (1− σ)
(
2−W2
W2
τ21
τ11
)−σ
τ21
τ11
−W ′2W2−W ′2(2−W2)
W 22
A
B2
+
+
µ
2W
′
2D − (1− σ)
(
2−W2
W2
τ22
τ12
)−σ [−W ′2W2−W ′2(2−W2)
W 22
τ22
τ12
+ 2−W2W2
(
− τ22
τ212
)]
C
D2
=
=
−µ2W ′2(1 + τ1−σ) + (1− σ)τ−στW ′2
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
+
µ
2W
′
2(1 + τ
σ−1) + (1− σ)τσ
[
W ′2τ−1 +
τi
2τ2e
]
(1 + τσ−1)2
.
Equivalently (using W ′1 = −W ′2):
W ′1
2
=
W ′1
[
(1− σ)τ1−σ − µ2 (1 + τ1−σ)
]
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
+
W ′1
[
(1− σ)τσ−1 + µ2 (1 + τσ−1)
]
(1 + τσ−1)2
−
1−σ
2τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
.
Solving for W ′1:
W ′1 =
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1
1−A−B , (A.3)
in which:
A =
2(1− σ)τ1−σ − µ(1 + τ1−σ)
(1 + τ1−σ)2
;
39
APPENDIX A. MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
B =
2(1− σ)τσ−1 + µ(1 + τσ−1)
(1 + τσ−1)2
.
It is straightforward to see that 1−A−B > 0 (only the last term is negative):
1−A−B = 1 + 2(σ − 1)τ
1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
2(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
+
µ
1 + τ1−σ
− µ
1 + τσ−1
.
A.2 Proof of lemmas
A.2.1 Lemma 2.3.1
Proof. We want to show that
dω1
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
Using (2.7), we write W2 as function of W1, and differentiate the expression using the chain rule
and the Implicit Function Theorem.
dω1
dτ22
=
d
(
W1(W1,W2)
P1(W1,W2)
)
dτ22
=
∂W1
∂τ22
P1(W1)− dP1dτ22W1
P1(W1)2
, (A.4)
where
dP1
dτ22
=
[
∂P1(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
∂W1
∂τ22
]
.
From Claim A.1.1, when L1 = L2, τ11 = τ22 = τi and τ12 = τ21 = τe, it is always the case that
W1 = W2 = 1. Then (A.4) becomes:
dω1
dτ22
=
∂W1
∂τ22
P1(W1)−
[
∂P1(W1)
∂τ22
+ ∂P1(W1)∂W1
∂W1
∂τ22
]
P1(W1)2
. (A.5)
From Claims A.1.5 and A.1.2, we know that ∂W1∂τ22 < 0 and that P1(W1) > 0.
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Since P1 does not depend on the internal transportation costs of region 2, τ22, from (2.10) we have
that ∂P1(W1)∂τ22 = 0. Therefore, the second term in the numerator of (A.5) becomes:
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
∂W1
∂τ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
{
1− σ
2
[(
1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]}
∂W1
∂τ22
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21:
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)] −µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
) dW1
dτ22
. (A.6)
With P1 at equilibrium values, P1 = γ
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)] −µ
σ−1 , and using (A.6), (A.5) becomes:
dω1
dτ22
=
dW1
dτ22
P1
−
µ
2P1
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
)
dW1
dτ22
P 21
=
dW1
dτ22
P1
−
µ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
)
dW1
dτ22
P1
.
To prove Lemma 2.3.1 we note that:
dW1
dτ22
[
1− µτ
σ−1
i − τσ−1e
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
]
< 0⇒ dω1
dτ22
< 0.
Given that τi > τe, it is clear that 0 <
µ(τσ−1i −τσ−1e )
τσ−1i +τ
σ−1
e
< 1, finishing the proof.
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A.2.2 Lemma 2.3.2
Proof. We want to show that
dω2
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
> 0.
Using (2.7), we write W2 as function of W1, and differentiate the expression using the chain rule
and the Implicit Function Theorem.
dω2
dτ22
=
d
(
W2(W1,W2)
P2(W1,W2)
)
dτ22
=
dW2
dτ22
P2(W1)− dP2dτ22W2
P2(W1)2
, (A.7)
where:
dP2
dτ22
=
[
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
]
. (A.8)
From (2.11), we compute the first term in (A.8):
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ (
−2−W1
τ222
)
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2i . (A.9)
Secondly, we study the second term of (A.8):
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
dW1
dτ22
.
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Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
. (A.10)
With (A.9) and (A.10), equation (A.8) becomes:
dP2
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µσ−1−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
.
With P2 at the equilibrium value, P2 = γ
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µ
σ−1 , equation (A.7) becomes:
dω2
dτ22
=
dW2
dτ22
P2
−
µ
2P2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
P 22
=
dW2
dτ22
P2
−
µ
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
P2
. (A.11)
To prove that (A.11) is positive, we note that:
dW2
dτ22
− µ (τσ−1e + τσ−1i )−1 (τσ−1i − τσ−1e ) dW2dτ22 + µ (τσ−1e + τσ−1i )−1 τσ−2i =
=
dW2
dτ22
(
1− µτ
σ−1
i − τσ−1e
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)
+
µτσ−2i
τσ−1e + τσ−1i
> 0.
From Claims A.1.5 and A.1.4, we know that dW2dτ22 > 0, thus the proof is finished.
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A.2.3 Lemma 2.3.3
Proof. By the chain rule:
dP1
dτ22
=
∂P1(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
. (A.12)
From (2.10), we know that ∂P1(W1)∂τ22 = 0, and thus (A.12) becomes:
dP1
dτ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
2−W1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]
dW1
dτ22
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
dP1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
) dW1
dτ22
.
As γ > 0, τi > τe and (from Claim A.1.5) dW1dτ22 < 0, the proof is finished.
A.2.4 Lemma 2.3.4
Proof. By the chain rule:
dP2
dτ22
=
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
. (A.13)
From (2.11), we compute the first term of (A.13):
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
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1− σ
2
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ (
−2−W1
τ222
)
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21 above, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2i . (A.14)
Secondly, we study the second term of (A.13):
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
dW1
dτ22
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
. (A.15)
With (A.14) and (A.15), we compute dP2dτ22 :
dP2
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µσ−1−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
. (A.16)
Given that, in (A.16), γµ2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µ
σ−1−1 is positive, to finish the proof we need to show
the following inequality:
(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
< τσ−2i ⇔ τi(1− τσ−1)
dW2
dτ22
< 1.
Importing the expression (A.2):
τi(1− τσ−1)
(σ−1)τσ−1
2τi(1+τσ−1)2
1 + µ
1+τ1−σ − µ1+τσ−1 + 2(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
< 1⇔
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⇔ 1− τ
σ−1
2
(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
< 1 +
µ
1 + τ1−σ
− µ
1 + τσ−1
+
2(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
.
Since the expression on the left is lower than the last term of the expression on the right, the proof
is finished.
A.2.5 Lemma 2.3.5
Proof. Observe that:
dP1
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
∂P1
∂τ12
+
∂P1
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
. (A.17)
As ∂P1∂τ12 = 0, (A.17) becomes:
dP1
dτ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
2−W1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]}
dW1
dτ12
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
dP1
dτ12
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
) dW1
dτ12
.
From Claim A.1.6, we know that ∂W1∂τ12 > 0, and the proof is finished.
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A.2.6 Lemma 2.3.6
Proof. Observe that:
dP2
τ12
=
∂P2
∂τ12
+
∂P2
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
. (A.18)
Firstly, we study the first term in (A.18):
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
[
1− σ
2
(
W1
τ12
)−σ (−W1
τ212
)]
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µσ−1−1 [σ − 1
2
τσ−2e
]
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2e . (A.19)
Secondly, we study the second term in (A.18), then:
∂P2
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
dW1
dτ12
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ12
. (A.20)
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Adding (A.19) and (A.20), we obtain:
dP2
dτ12
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) ∂W1
∂τ12
− τσ−2e
]
.
From Claim A.1.6, dW1dτ12 > 0, which implies that
dP2
dτ12
< 0.
A.3 Proof of propositions
A.3.1 Proposition 2.3.1
Proof. Let Z11 and ZK11 be the ratio between region 1’s expenditure on local manufactures and that
on manufactures from the other region in the model with equal internal and external trade costs and
in the model without internal trade costs, respectively. Then, from (2.2), and for τ11 = τ22 = τi,
τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ =
τe
τi
, we have:
Z11 =
E11
E12
=
(
W1τe
W2τi
)1−σ L1
L2
=
(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ L1
L2
= Z11
K .
Analogously, from (2.3):
Z12 =
E21
E22
=
(
W1τi
W2τe
)1−σ L1
L2
=
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ L1
L2
= Z12
K
Next, we show that the nominal wages, W1 and W2, when regions have equal internal trade costs
and equal external trades costs are the same as in the case in which regions have only an external
trade costs, τ = τeτi .
From (2.8) and (2.9) with τi = τ22 = τ11 and τe = τ12 = τ21, the nominal wages satisfy:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τe
W2τi
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τe
W2τi
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1τi
W2τe
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W2L2)
1 +
(
W1τi
W2τe
)1−σ
L1
L2
 ; (A.21)
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W2 =
µ
L2
 1−µ2 +W1L1
1 +
(
W1τe
W2τ i
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
1−µ
2 +W2L2
1 +
(
W1τ i
W2τe
)1−σ
L1
L2
 . (A.22)
Since τ = τeτi , (A.21) and (A.22) become:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W2L2)
1 +
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ
L1
L2
 ;
W2 =
µ
L2
 1−µ2 +W1L1
1 +
(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
1−µ
2 +W2L2
1 +
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ
L1
L2
 .
These expressions coincide with those of the classical model of Krugman. There is a single
equilibrium, as shown by Mossay (2006). Therefore, the nominal wages coincide:
W1 = W
K
1 and W2 = W
K
2 .
The inclusion of internal trade costs changes the price index of manufactured goods. Let PM1 be
the price index of manufactured goods in the model with equal internal and external trade costs, and
let PKM1 be the price index of manufactured goods in the model without internal trade costs. For
τ11 = τ22 = τi, τ12 = τ21 = τe, and τ = τeτi , we have:
PM1 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τi
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τe
)1−σ] 11−σ
⇔
⇔ PM1τi = γ
[
fW1
1−σ + (1− f)
(
W2
τ
)1−σ] 11−σ
= PM1
K .
Doing the same for PM2, we verify that the manufacturing price indexes increase to compensate for
the internal “iceberg” trade costs:
PM1 =
PKM1
τi
and PM2 =
PKM2
τi
.
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This implies that:
ω1 =
W1
PµM1
=
WK1
(PKM1/τi)
µ
= ωK1 τ
µ
i and ω2 = ω
K
2 τ
µ
i .
The internal trade costs decrease the real wages in the same proportion, therefore, the relative real
wage remains unaltered:
ω1
ω2
=
ωK1 τ
µ
i
ωK2 τ
µ
i
=
ωK1
ωK2
.
A.3.2 Proposition 2.3.2
Proof. We want to show that
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
We have:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ22
ω2 − dω2dτ22ω1
ω22
. (A.23)
From Claim A.1.3, we know that ω1 = ω2 > 0, therefore, (A.23) can be written as:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ22
− dω2dτ22
ω2
.
From Lemma 2.3.1 and Lemma 2.3.2, we know that dω1dτ22 < 0 and
dω2
dτ22
> 0 respectively, thus:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
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A.3.3 Proposition 2.3.3
Proof. We want to know the sign of:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ12
ω2 − dω2dτ12ω1
ω22
,
where
dω1
dτ12
=
d
(
W1
P1
)
dτ12
=
dW1
dτ12
P1 −
(
∂P1
∂τ12
+ ∂P1∂W1
dW1
dτ12
)
W1
P 21
and
dω2
dτ12
=
d
(
W2
P2
)
dτ12
=
dW2
dτ12
P2 −
(
∂P2
∂τ12
+ ∂P2∂W1
dW1
dτ12
)
W2
P 22
.
When L1 = L2, τ22 = τ11 = τi and τ12 = τ21 = τe, from Claims A.1.1, A.1.2 and A.1.3, we know
that W1 = W2 = 1, P1 = P2 and ω1 = ω2. Simplifying:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ12
− dω2dτ12
ω2
,
with
dω1
dτ12
− dω2
dτ12
=
(
dW1
dτ12
− dW2dτ12
)
P1 +
∂P2
∂τ12
− ∂P1∂τ12 + ∂P2∂W1 dW1dτ12 − ∂P1∂W1 dW1dτ12
P 21
.
From Claim A.1.4 and (2.10), we know that dW1dτ12 = −dW2dτ12 and that ∂P1∂τ12 = 0. Then:
dω1
dτ12
− dω2
dτ12
=
1
P 21
[
dW1
dτ12
(
2P1 +
∂P2
∂W1
− ∂P1
∂W1
)
+
∂P2
∂τ12
]
.
The next stage is to compute ∂P2∂W1 ,
∂P1
∂W1
and ∂P2∂τ12 .
Using (2.11), we find:
∂P2
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
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1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τ11 = τ22 = τi, τ12 = τ21 = τe and P1 = γ
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µ
σ−1 :
∂P2
∂W1
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
=
= µP1
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
τσ−1e + τσ−1i
= −µP1 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
.
Using (2.10) we find that ∂P1∂W1 = − ∂P2∂W1 :
∂P1
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
2−W1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]
=
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
)
.
From (2.11), we compute ∂P2∂τ12 :
∂P2
∂τ12
= − µ
σ − 1γ
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
(
W1
τ12
)−σ (
−W1
τ212
)
= −γµ
2
τσ−2e
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
= −µP1 τ
σ−2
e
τσ−1e + τσ−1i
= −µP1 τ
σ−1τ−1e
1 + τσ−1
.
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Then, replacing:
P1
(
dω1
dτ12
− dω2
dτ12
)
= 2
dW1
dτ12
(
1− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
)
− µτ
−1
e τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
.
The sign of d(ω1/ω2)dτ12 is positive whenever:
dW1
dτ12
>
µτ−1e
2
τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1− µ1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
=
µτ−1e
2 τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1 − µ(1− τσ−1) .
Importing the expression (A.3) for W ′1 > 0 obtained in Claim A.1.6:
W ′1 =
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1
1−A−B ,
where
A = −2(σ − 1)τ
1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)2
− µ
1 + τ1−σ
, and B = −2(σ − 1)τ
σ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
+
µ
1 + τσ−1
.
Recalling that τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
= τ
1−σ
(1+τ1−σ)2
, we know that d(ω1/ω2)dτ12 > 0 if and only if:
σ − 1
1 + 4(σ − 1) τσ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
+ µ
1+τ1−σ − µ1+τσ−1
>
µ
2 (1 + τ
σ−1)2
1 + τσ−1 − µ(1− τσ−1) .
With some manipulation:
2(σ − 1)
(1 + τσ−1)2
>
µ+ 4µ(σ − 1) τσ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
− µ2 1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1 + τσ−1 − µ(1− τσ−1) .
It is clear that this is true when µ→ 0. When µ→ 1, the expression becomes:
4(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
> 1 +
4(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
− 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
2τσ−1,
which is clearly false.
To show that the expression is true if and only if µ is lower or equal than some µ∗ ∈ (0, 1), notice
that it is equivalent to a U-shaped parabola.
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ12
> 0⇔ aµ2 + bµ+ c > 0, where a = 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
.
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A.3.4 Proposition 2.3.4
Proof. We want to show that
dω1
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
> 0.
dω1
dτ12
=
d
(
W1
P1
)
dτ12
=
dW1
dτ12
P1 −
[
∂P1
∂τ12
+ ∂P1∂W1
dW1
dτ12
]
W1
P 21
. (A.24)
When L1 = L2, τ11 = τ22 = τi and τ12 = τ21 = τe, from Claim A.1.1 we know that W1 = 1 and
from (2.10) we find that ∂P1∂τ12 = 0. Then, simplifying (A.24):
dω1
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dW1
dτ12
P1 − ∂P1∂W1 dW1dτ12
P 21
. (A.25)
From (2.10) we evaluate:
∂P1
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
[
1
2
(τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e )
]− µ
σ−1−1 1− σ
2
(τσ−1i − τσ−1e ) = µP1
1− τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
< P1.
A.3.5 Proposition 2.3.5
Proof. We want to show that
dω2
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
dω2
dτ12
=
d
(
W2
P2
)
dτ12
=
dW2
dτ12
P2 −
(
∂P2
∂τ12
+ ∂P2∂W1
dW1
dτ12
)
W2
P 22
. (A.26)
From Claim A.1.1 we can rewrite (A.26) in the following way:
dω2
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dW2
dτ12
P2 − ∂P2∂τ12 − ∂P2∂W1 dW1dτ12
P 22
. (A.27)
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From Claim A.1.6 we know that dW1dτ12 > 0 and from Claim A.1.4 we know that
dW2
dτ12
= −dW1dτ12 . Then,
the sign of (A.27) is the same as the sign of:
−dW1
dτ12
(
P2 +
∂P2
∂W1
)
− ∂P2
∂τ12
.
From (2.11):
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
[
1− σ
2
(
W1
τ12
)−σ (−W1
τ212
)]
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 [σ − 1
2
τσ−2e
]
=
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2e = −µP2τ−1e
τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
. (A.28)
Again from (2.11):
∂P2
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂W1
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
= −µP2 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
. (A.29)
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With (A.28) and (A.29), we observe that:
dω2
dτ12
< 0⇔ dW1
dτ12
(
1− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
)
− µτ−1e
τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
> 0.
Importing the expression (A.3) obtained in Claim A.1.6:
dW1
dτ12
=
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1
1 + 4(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2 − µ1−τ
σ−1
1+τσ−1
.
Thus dω2dτ12 < 0 if and only if:
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1− µ1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1 + 4(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2 − µ1−τ
σ−1
1+τσ−1
> µτ−1e
τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
⇔
⇔ σ − 1
1 + τσ−1
1− µ1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1 + 4(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2 − µ1−τ
σ−1
1+τσ−1
> µ⇔
⇔ σ − 1
1 + τσ−1
(
1− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
)
− µ
[
1 +
4(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
]
> 0.
The expression on the left is a U-shaped parabola, therefore, all we need to check is that the
inequality is true when µ → 0 and false when µ → 1. It is easy to see that when µ → 0, the
inequality is true. When µ→ 1, the inequality becomes:
σ − 1
1 + τσ−1
− (σ − 1)(1− τ
σ−1)
(1 + τσ−1)2
− 1− 4(σ − 1)τ
σ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
+
1− τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
> 0⇔
⇔ (σ − 1)
[ −2τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
]
− 1 + 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
> 0.
Which is clearly false.
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CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF POPULATION SKILLS IN THE CORE-PERIPHERY
MODEL
3.1 Introduction
The new economic geography has been involved with well-defined phenomena, explaining
mainly how economic integration affects the spatial distribution of the economic activity.
These results are summarized in Baldwin et al.(2003).
Although its fundamental interest has been the effect of trade costs in the regional structure
of the economic activity, the standard framework can be used to study other interesting
issues, like the impact of the employment structure in the location of economic activity.
Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), whose theory studies essentially
agglomeration generated by demand, relate the expenditure share of industrial goods with
spatial agglomeration.
By contrast, Ottaviano et al. (2002), whose theory is associated with supply, link the
share of industrial employment with the degree of agglomeration. Their results do not
depend on the expenditure share on the manufacturing sector because the absence of general
equilibrium income effects - they use a quasi-linear utility function.
Applying a model reflecting effects both from demand and supply side, we generalize
the model of Krugman (1991) including a precise parameter for the share of industrial
employment in the economy.
Unlike Krugman (1991), we relax the constraint that the share of industrial employment is
always equal to the share spending in industrial goods, and unlike Ottaviano, Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002), we use a standard utility function, Cobb-Douglas/CES model, exhibitting
general equilibrium income effects1.
1In Pflu¨ger and Su¨dekum (2008a) there is a synthesis of different classes of utility functions applied in
new economic geography models.
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3.2 The model
This framework generalizes the core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) by including a
specific parameter for the supply of industrial workers, M .
Krugman (1991) assumes that the total supply of industrial workers is:
M1 +M2 = µ,
where, M1 and M2 are the supply of industrial workers in region 1 and 2 respectively, and
µ is the share of spending in industrial goods. In our model, the share of industrial workers
in the economy, M can be different from the share of spending in industrial goods, µ:
M1 +M2 = M, with M ∈ (0, 1).
The economy comprises two regions and two sectors: an agricultural sector and an
industrial sector. There are two factors of production: farmers and industrial workers (M ).
Farmers are immobile across regions, while industrial workers are mobile.
The supply of farmers is the same in each region2, 1−M
2
, and the total population is
normalized to unity.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale using only farmers. Transportation of agricultural output across
regions is costless. The industrial sector produces a horizontally differentiated product
using only industrial workers. Transportation of industrial goods is subject to iceberg
transportation costs. For each unit of industrial good that is shipped to the other region,
only a fraction τ , with 0 < τ < 1, arrives.
2Krugman (1991) assumes that the supply of farmers in each region is 1−µ2 .
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All the agents have the same preferences for consumption of industrial goods (CM ), and
agricultural goods (CA). The preferences are represented by the following utility function:
U = CµMC
1−µ
A ,
CM =
[
n∑
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
i
] σ
σ−1
,
where µ ∈ (0, 1), is the share of spending on industrial goods; n is the number of varieties
of industrial goods; ci is the consumption of the industrial good produced by firm i; and,
finally, σ > 1 is the elasticities of substitution among industrial goods.
The agricultural sector produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale. The
sector is perfectly competitive, therefore:
WA = pA,
where WA is the nominal wage of the farmers, and pA is the price of an agricultural good,
taken as given by the firms and chosen to be the numeraire (pA = 1).
All industrial firms in region i, for i ∈ {1, 2} support a fixed cost of α units of industrial
workers, and a variable cost of β units of industrial workers per unit of good produced.
Firms choose a quantity, qi, for i ∈ {1, 2} to maximize profit. This implies that:
pi =
σ
σ − 1βWi,
where pi is the equilibrium price of each firm.
Given the assumption of free entry, we obtain the quantity produced by each industrial firm
in region i ∈ {1, 2}:
qi =
α
β
(σ − 1).
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3.2.1 Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run, variables are determined by taking as given the amount of industrial
workers in each region, M1 and M2.
We define Z11 as the ratio between region 1’s expenditure on local industrial goods and
region 1’s expenditure on industrial goods imported from region 2:
Z11 =
M1
M2
(
W1τ
W2
)−(σ−1)
. (3.1)
With a similar procedure we obtain Z12, the ratio between region 2’s spending on region 1
products and local products:
Z12 =
M1
M2
(
W1
W2τ
)−(σ−1)
. (3.2)
Let Y1 and Y2 denote the nominal regional income, which is equal to the sum of the incomes
in the agricultural and the industrial sectors:
Y1 =
1−M
2
+W1M1, and Y2 =
1−M
2
+W2M2. (3.3)
The nominal wage of workers in region 1, W1, is equal to the spending on region 1’s
industrial goods:
W1 =
µ
M1
[
Z11
1 + Z11
Y1 +
Z12
1 + Z12
Y2
]
, (3.4)
Similarly, the nominal wage of workers in region 2 is:
W2 =
µ
M2
[
1
1 + Z11
Y1 +
1
1 + Z12
Y2
]
. (3.5)
For a given distribution of industrial workers in regions 1 and 2, equations (3.1) − (3.5) are
a system that determines W1 and W2.
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However, workers are interested not in nominal wages but in real wages, and these depend
on the cost of living in each region. Therefore the price index in region 1, P1 is:
P1 =
[
M1W
−(σ−1)
1 +M2
(
W2
τ
)−(σ−1)]−µ/(σ−1)
,
and the price index in region 2 is:
P2 =
[
M1
(
W1
τ
)−(σ−1)
+M2W
−(σ−1)
2
]−µ/(σ−1)
.
Workers seek the region with the highest utility or, equivalently, the highest real wage.
Then, the real wages of workers in region 1, ω1 is:
ω1 =
W1
P1
,
and the real wage of workers in region 2, ω2 is:
ω2 =
W2
P2
.
3.2.2 Long-run equilibrium
The long-run equilibrium is a situation where migration does not occur. We say that it is
stable if it is robust to small perturbations of the distribution of workers across regions.
Dispersion is a long-run equilibrium configuration if regions have the same real wage. It is
stable if a small migration to region 1 decreases the real wage in region 1, implying that the
initial configuration is reestablished. Precisely:
ω1
ω2
|f=f∗= 1
2
= 1 and
[
∂
(
w1
w2
)
/∂f
]
|f=f∗ < 0,
where f = M1
M
is the share of industrial workers in region 1.
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Concentration is a long-run equilibrium configuration where all industrial workers are
concentrated in the region that has the highest real wage. Concentration in region 1 and
in region 2 satisfies, respectively:
f ∗ = 1, ω1 ≥ ω2 and (for stability) ∃ > 0 : 1−  < f < 1⇒ ω1 ≥ ω2;
f ∗ = 0, ω1 ≤ ω2 and (for stability) ∃ > 0 : 0 < f < ⇒ ω1 ≤ ω2.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 The spatial distribution of the economic activity
In this section, we study how changes in the share of industrial workers in the economy,
M , affect the spatial distribution of the economic activity. We use numerical examples to
do this study.
For the case in which the share of the spending in industrial goods, µ, is always equal
to the share of industrial workers in the economy3, M , we can see from figure4 3.1, that
an increase in M (and µ) make dispersion become unstable, and concentration will be an
equilibrium configuration.
However, since µ is also a parameter representing preference for industrial goods, and
considering intuitively, that µ varies slower thanM , we should expect that an increase in the
share of industrial activity in the economy does not imply, directly, an increase in the share
of spending in industrial goods. Therefore, figure 3.25 illustrates how an increase in M
3This is the case in Krugman (1991).
4To plot this figure, we have set τ = 0.5 and σ = 4.
5To plot this figure, we have set τ = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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from 0.3 to 0.5, affects the spatial distribution of the economic activity, when µ is invariant.
In this case, we can see that spatial distribution of economic activity is independent of M .
Indeed, the curve that depicts all short-run equilibrium points (ω1
ω2
, f) remains unchanged
for M = 0.3 and M = 0.56.
Figure 3.1: Dispersion becomes unstable. Figure 3.2: Industrial location remains
unchanged.
3.3.2 Welfare analysis
It is clear in our numerical example, that for a given share of spending in industrial goods, a
change in structure of labor supply does not affect the geographic location of the economic
activity.
An interesting result arises when we study how a change in employment structure affects
the welfare. Considering an equilibrium configuration in which regions have the same share
of industrial activity (dispersion, f = 0.5) we examine how an increase in M influences the
6Using other parameter values for M in our numerical example, we obtain the same result.
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welfare (the real wage) of each industrial worker and the regional welfare (the real regional
income).
Figure 3.3: The real wage in both regions for
different values of M .
Figure 3.4: The optimal real regional income.
We can see from figure 3.3 that an increase in M decreases the real wages of the industrial
workers in each region7. Thus, for a given µ, more industrial activity in the economy
reduces the welfare of the industrial workers in each region.
An interesting result is the impact of M on the regional welfare. From figure 3.4, we can
see that there is a M that maximizes the regional welfare8. Note that, for µ = 0.3, the
highest real regional income is obtained when M = 0.4, point E∗.
Since point E∗ represents a case in which the real wages of the industrial workers are lower
than the real wages of the farmers, the maximum regional welfare would be attained by
introducing a monetary incentive promoting industrial activity in the economy. Note that,
7Since initial equilibrium is dispersion, it is clear that real wages are equal in equilibrium. As an increase
in M does not affects the spatial distribution of the economic activity, all changes in the employment structure
produce the same impact on the welfare of regions, when f=0.5.
8To plot these figures, we have set τ = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4.
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without a monetary incentive, an increase in the regional welfare from point E0 to E∗ is
obtained with a decrease in the welfare of the industrial workers, from E0 to E1 (figure
3.3), and in this case, no farmer wants to become an industrial worker.
3.4 Concluding remarks
We extend the core-periphery model introducing a specific parameter for the share of
industrial workers in the economy. We study how an increase in this parameter affects
the geography of the economic activity and the welfare. A numerical example suggests that
spatial distribution of the economic activity is independent of the employment structure, but
there is a share of employment in the industrial sector that maximizes the regional welfare.
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Chapter 4
A third sector in the core-periphery model:non-
tradable goods
? The results in this chapter have been published in a working paper (Leite et al., 2009b)
CHAPTER 4. A THIRD SECTOR IN THE CORE-PERIPHERY
MODEL:NON-TRADABLE GOODS
4.1 Introduction
The literature on new economic geography has grown extensively over the two last
decades. The idea of trade and geography in general equilibrium models was introduced
for the first time by Krugman (1991), who developed a model illustrating how a country
can endogenously become differentiated into an industrialized core and an agricultural
periphery. In this model, trade costs are crucial to explain the spatial distribution of
economic activity. If trade costs are high, industrial activity is dispersed across regions,
while if trade costs are low, then industrial activity becomes concentrated in one region.
Despite it being a stylized fact that services (which are mainly non-tradable) have a very
significant weight in the developed economies, representing more than two thirds of the
total employment in the EU27, the standard literature in new economic geography assumes
that regions have an “agricultural” sector (which produces perfectly tradable goods) and an
“industrial” sector (which produces partially tradable goods).1 A notable exception is the
work of Helpman (1998) who substituted the agricultural sector by a perfectly competitive
non-tradable goods sector (housing). Assuming that the location of this sector is exogenous,
Helpman showed that housing acts as a dispersion force, by increasing the cost-of-living in
a more populated region.
This result also appears in the economic geography model developed by Pflu¨ger and
Su¨dekum (2008b), in which agents are assumed to have a logarithmic quasi-linear utility
function and housing costs act in the spirit of Helpman (1998). They show that, starting
from a situation of dispersion of industrial activity, falling trade costs lead to agglomeration.
However, when trade costs become sufficiently low, the relative importance of housing
1See, for example, the works of Puga (1999), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001), Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003) and Baldwin et al. (2003).
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prices dominates the agglomeration forces, and dispersion occurs again. Contrasting with
most new economic geography models, which feature ‘bang-bang’ phenomena (either
symmetric dispersion or full agglomeration of the industrial activity in one of two regions),
their model can generate partial agglomeration.
In the model of Behrens (2004), the absence of interregional trade is an endogenous
outcome. Firms want to sell in the locations that allow them to make a positive profit.
Depending on the level of trade costs and on the degree of competition, each good may be
effectively traded in equilibrium or not. Behrens (2004) shows that when the trade costs
are higher than a threshold value, all the industrial goods are non-tradable. In such an
environment, the economy comprises only an agricultural (traditional) sector and a non-
tradable goods sector. For this particular case, Behrens (2004) also shows that full and
partial agglomeration in the non-tradable sector arises in a completely autarchic world, and
the structure of the spatial economy is determined by the ratio of the mobile to immobile
factor.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no model that explains the spatial distribution of
the production of both tradable and non-tradable goods. In order to fill this gap, this
paper generalizes the analytically solvable core-periphery model of Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003) by considering a third sector, which produces non-tradable goods (services). Like
the industrial sector, this service sector is assumed to be monopolistically competitive and
mobile across regions.
Workers and firms operating in the industrial and service sectors move to the region with
the highest utility level, until a spatial equilibrium is reached. We find that the resulting
configuration may consist in full agglomeration, symmetric dispersion, or a combination of
full agglomeration of industry with partial agglomeration of the service sector.
A strong preference for variety in the service sector is a very strong agglomeration force.
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For any value of the trade costs, full agglomeration of industry and services in one region
is an equilibrium whenever the elasticity of substitution among services is lower than a
threshold value.
If the preference for variety of services is relatively weak, trade costs become crucial to
explain the location of the economic activity. If trade costs are high, the industry and
services become symmetrically dispersed across regions. If trade costs are low, then the
industry becomes agglomerated in one region, while the services become only partially
agglomerated. In this case, the region where all the industrial activity takes place will have
more than one-half of the service sector activity.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Basic setup
The model is an extension of the analytically solvable core-periphery model of Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003) that incorporates a third sector of services (non-tradable goods).2
The economy comprises two regions and three sectors: an agricultural sector (perfectly
tradable goods), an industrial sector (partially tradable goods) and a service sector (non-
tradable goods). There are three factors of production: unskilled workers (L), industrial
sector workers (M ) and service sector workers (S). The unskilled workers are immobile
across regions, while the industrial and service workers are mobile.
2It is straightforward to verify that by considering that the size of the service sector in null (µs = 0), we
obtain the model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
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We denote by M1 and M2, with M1 +M2 = M , the supply of industrial workers in regions
1 and 2, respectively, and by S1 and S2, with S1 +S2 = S, the supply of service workers in
regions 1 and 2, respectively. The supply of unskilled workers is the same in each region,
L1 = L2 = L/2, and the total population is normalized to unity, L+M + S = 1.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale using only unskilled labor. Transportation of agricultural output
across regions is costless. The industrial sector and the service sector produce a horizontally
differentiated product using sector-specific labor (fixed cost) and unskilled labor (variable
cost).
Transportation of industrial goods and services is subject to iceberg transportation costs.
For each unit of industrial good that is shipped to the other region, only a fraction
τm ∈ (0, 1) arrives. The trade of services across regions is more costly: only a fraction
τs ∈ [0, τm] arrives. We will give particular attention to the case in which services are
non-tradable across regions (τs = 0).
All the agents have the same preferences for consumption of industrial goods (CM ), services
(CS) and agricultural goods (CA). A natural extension of the utility function used by
Krugman (1991) and by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) to an economy with three sectors
is the following:
U = CµmM C
µs
S C
1−µm−µs
A ,
CM =
(
nm∑
i=1
c
σm−1
σm
mi
) σm
σm−1
, (4.1)
CS =
(
ns∑
i=1
c
σs−1
σs
si
) σs
σs−1
,
where µm ∈ (0, 1) and µs ∈ (0, 1), with µm + µs < 1, are the shares of spending on
industrial products and on services; nm and ns are the number of varieties of industrial
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goods and of services; cmi and csj are the consumption of the industrial good produced by
firm i and of the service provided by the firm j; and, finally, σm > 1 and σs > 1 are the
elasticities of substitution among industrial goods and among services.
4.2.2 Supply
Agricultural sector
In the agricultural sector, firms use unskilled labor to produce a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale. The production function is qA = L, where qA is the amount
of agricultural goods produced and L is the quantity of unskilled labor employed. The
cost function is CTA = WaqA, where Wa is the nominal wage of the unskilled workers
employed. The profit function is:
ΠA = (pa −Wa)qA,
where pa is the price of an agricultural good, taken as given by the firms (perfect
competition) and chosen to be the numeraire (pa = 1).
The sector is perfectly competitive, therefore: Wa = pa = 1.
Industrial sector
Firms in the industrial sector support a fixed cost of αm units of industrial labor, and a
variable cost of β units of unskilled labor per unit of good produced. SinceWa = 1, the cost
function is CTM = αmWm + βqM , where qM is the quantity of industrial goods produced
by an industrial firm and Wm is the nominal wage of the industrial workers employed by
the firm. The profit function is:
ΠM = pM(qM)qM − βqM − αmWm. (4.2)
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Firms choose qM to maximize profit. This implies that:
pM =

− 1β,
where  is the price-elasticity of demand.
Since there is a large number of firms in the industrial sector,  ≈ σm (we have equality if
there is a continuum of firms). Thus:3
pM =
σm
σm − 1β. (4.3)
Given the assumption of free entry, the profit of each firm must be zero. Substituting (4.3)
in (4.2), we obtain:
qM =
αm
β
(σm − 1)Wm (4.4)
Since an industrial firm employs αm units of skilled labor, the total demand for skilled labor
is nmαm. Therefore, the number of firms must be:
nm =
M
αm
. (4.5)
Service sector
Firms in the service sector use αs units of service workers as a fixed cost, and β units of
unskilled labor per unit of product.
As in the industrial sector, the price chosen by each firm is:
pS =
σs
σs − 1β.
3In the case of Cournot competition: 1 =
1
σm
+s(1− 1σm ), where s is the market share of each firm. With
many firms in the economy (s ≈ 0), the price elasticity of demand, , is approximately equal to the elasticity
of substitution among the differentiated goods, σm.
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The quantity produced by each firm is:
qS =
αs
β
(σs − 1)Ws, (4.6)
where Ws is the nominal wage of the service workers employed by the firm.
And the number of firms is:
ns =
S
αs
. (4.7)
4.2.3 Demand
Industrial sector
Individual demand for each industrial variety is obtained from utility maximization (4.1)
with respect to cmj . It can be shown that (Baldwin et al., 2003, pp. 38-39):
cmj = p
−σm
j
µmy∑nm
i=1 p
1−σm
i
,
where y is the income of the agent.
The industrial price index can be defined as:
Pm =
(
nm∑
i=1
pi
1−σm
) 1
1−σm
. (4.8)
Using (4.8), the individual demand for the industrial variety j becomes:
cmj =
p−σmj
P 1−σmm
µmy.
Each firm sells its products in both regions. The price of a representative local industrial
good is pii = σmσm−1β, and the price of a product that is exported from region i to region j is
pij = τ
−1
m
σm
σm−1β.
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Since all manufacturing firms of a region set the same price, the industrial price index in
region i is:
Pmi =
(
nmipii
1−σm + nmjpij1−σm
) 1
1−σm =
=
βσm
σm − 1
(
nmi + nmjτ
σm−1
m
) 1
1−σm ,
where nmi and nmj are the number of industrial firms in regions i and j, respectively.
Defining φm = τσm−1m as the degree of economic integration for the industrial sector
(Baldwin et al., 2003), we obtain:
Pmi =
βσm
σm − 1 (nmi + nmjφm)
1
1−σm . (4.9)
Denoting the total demand of an industrial product that is produced in region i and
consumed in region j by Cmij , we have:
Cmii =
p−σmii
P 1−σmmi
µmYi and Cmij =
p−σmij
P 1−σmmj
µmYj,
where Yi and Yj are the nominal incomes in regions i and j, respectively.
Since pii = βσmσm−1 and pij = τ
−1
m
βσm
σm−1 , the above equations become:
Cmii =
(
βσm
σm−1
)−σm
P 1−σmmi
µmYi and Cmij =
τσmm
(
βσm
σm−1
)−σm
P 1−σmmj
µmYj. (4.10)
Denoting the output of an industrial firm in region i by qmi, we have:
qmi = Cmii + τ
−1
m Cmij . (4.11)
Substituting (4.10) in (4.11), we obtain:
qmi = µm
(
βσm
σm − 1
)−σm ( Yi
P 1−σmmi
+
τσm−1m Yj
P 1−σmmj
)
. (4.12)
75
CHAPTER 4. A THIRD SECTOR IN THE CORE-PERIPHERY
MODEL:NON-TRADABLE GOODS
Replacing (4.9) in (4.12):
qmi = µm
σm − 1
βσm
(
Yi
nmi + φmnmj
+
φmYj
φmnmi + nmj
)
.
Substituting (4.4) and (4.5) above, we obtain the nominal wage of the skilled workers in
each region:
Wmi =
µm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φmMj
+
φmYj
φmMi +Mj
)
. (4.13)
Service sector
All the expressions obtained in the previous subsection apply.
The individual demand for a service, csj , is:
csj =
p−σssj
P 1−σss
µsy,
where Ps =
(
ns∑
i=1
pi
1−σs
) 1
1−σs
.
The internal and external demand for a service produced in region i are:
Csii =
(
βσs
σs−1
)−σs
P 1−σssi
µsYi and Csij =
τσss
(
βσs
σs−1
)−σs
P 1−σssj
µsYj.
The output of a service provider in region i is:
qsi = µs
(
βσs
σs − 1
)−σs ( Yi
P 1−σssi
+
φsYj
P 1−σssj
)
,
where φs = τσs−1s is the degree of economic integration in the service sector.
The price index of services in region i is:
Psi =
βσs
σs − 1 (nsi + nsjφs)
1
1−σs , (4.14)
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where nsi and nsj are the number of service providers in region i and j, respectively.
The nominal wage of the skilled workers in the service sector in region i is:
Wsi =
µs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φsSj
+
φsYj
φsSi + Sj
)
. (4.15)
Regional income, perfect price index
The nominal income in region i, is equal to the sum of the incomes in the agricultural,
industrial and service sector:
Yi =
1−M − S
2
+WmiMi +WsiSi, for i = 1, 2. (4.16)
The perfect price index of region, Pi, aggregates three price indices: the price index of the
agricultural sector (normalized to 1), the price index of the industrial sector, Pmi, and the
price index of the service sector, Psi.
We obtain the price index of industrial goods in region i, by substituting (4.5) into (4.9):
Pmi =
βσm
σm − 1
(
Mi
αm
+
φmMj
αm
) 1
1−σm
, for i, j = 1, 2.
Denote the share of industrial workers in region 1 by fm = M1M . Substituting above:
Pm1 =
βσm
σm − 1
(
M
αm
) 1
1−σm
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
1
1−σm ,
and
Pm2 =
βσm
σm − 1
(
M
αm
) 1
1−σm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
1
1−σm .
Substituting (4.7) into (4.14), and defining fs = S1S as the share of service sector workers in
region 1, we obtain:
Ps1 =
βσs
σs − 1
(
S
αs
) 1
1−σs
[fs + (1− fs)φs]
1
1−σs ,
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and
Ps2 =
βσs
σs − 1
(
S
αs
) 1
1−σs
[φsfs + (1− fs)]
1
1−σs .
Using the last four expressions, we obtain the perfect price indices for each region:
P1 = ρ [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm [fs + (1− fs)φs]
µs
1−σs , (4.17)
and
P2 = ρ [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm [φsfs + (1− fs)]
µs
1−σs , (4.18)
where ρ =
(
βσm
σm − 1
)µm ( βσs
σs − 1
)µs (M
αm
) µm
1−σm
(
S
αs
) µs
1−σs
.
4.2.4 Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run, workers are immobile across regions. A short-run equilibrium consists in
the equality of supply and demand. Aggregate prices, output and wages are endogenously
determined.
Equations (4.13), (4.15), (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18) determine the short-run equilibrium of
the model. We recall these equations:
Wm1 =
µm
σm
(
Y1
M1 + φmM2
+
φmY2
φmM1 +M2
)
,
Wm2 =
µm
σm
(
Y2
M2 + φmM1
+
φmY1
φmM2 +M1
)
,
Ws1 =
µs
σs
(
Y1
S1 + φsS2
+
φsY2
φsS1 + S2
)
,
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Ws2 =
µs
σs
(
Y2
S2 + φsS1
+
φsY1
φsS2 + S1
)
,
Y1 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm1M1 +Ws1S1,
Y2 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm2M2 +Ws2S2,
P1 = ρ [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm [fs + (1− fs)φs]
µs
1−σs ,
P2 = ρ [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm [φsfs + (1− fs)]
µs
1−σs .
Solving these equations, we find the nominal wages of the workers in each region:4
Wm1 = Cσm2φmM1
[
σs − µs S1S2 (1− φ
2
s)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs (S
2
1 + S
2
2)
]
+
+ CσmM2
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
+
S2 − φsS1
φsS1 + S2
)}
,
Wm2 = Cσm2φmM2
[
σs − µs S1S2 (1− φ
2
s)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs (S
2
1 + S
2
2)
]
+
+ CσmM1
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m
S2 − φsS1
φsS1 + S2
+
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
)}
,
Ws1 = Dσs2φsS1
[
σm − µm M1M2 (1− φ
2
m)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm (M
2
1 +M
2
2 )
]
+
+ DσsS2
{
σm
[
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
(φ2s − 1)
]
− µm
(
φ2s
M1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
+
M2 − φmM1
φmM1 +M2
)}
,
4See Appendix B.1 for detailed calculations.
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Ws2 = Dσs2φsS2
[
σm − µm M1M2 (1− φ
2
m)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm (M
2
1 +M
2
2 )
]
+
+ DσsS1
{
σm
[
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
(φ2s − 1)
]
− µm
(
φ2s
M2 −M1φm
φmM1 +M2
+
M1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
)}
,
where
C =
µmσs
1−M−S
2
(S1 + φsS2)(φsS1 + S2)
R
,
D =
µsσm
1−M−S
2
(M1 + φmM2)(φmM1 +M2)
R
,
and
R = {σm (M1 + φmM2) [σs (S1 + φsS2)− S1µs]−M1µmσs (S1 + φsS2)} ×
× {σm (φmM1 +M2) [σs (φsS1 + S2)− S2µs]−M2µmσs (φsS1 + S2)} −
− [M1µmφmσs (φsS1 + S2) + S1µsφsσm (φmM1 +M2)]×
× [M2µmφmσs (S1 + φsS2) + S2µsφsσm (M1 + φmM2)] .
The real wages of the industrial sector workers in regions 1 and 2 are ωm1 =
Wm1
P1
and
ωm2 =
Wm2
P2
, and the real wages of the service sector workers in regions 1 and 2 are
ωs1 =
Ws1
P1
and ωs2 =
Ws2
P2
.
4.2.5 Long-run equilibrium
In the long-run, the skilled workers of the industrial and service sectors choose their location
with the objective of maximizing their utility (equivalently, they move to the region with
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the highest real wage).
Migration is assumed to be determined by the following processes:
f˙m =
dfm
dt
=

ωm1(fs, fm)− ωm2(fs, fm), if 0 < fm < 1
min {0, ωm1(fs, fm)− ωm2(fs, fm)} , if fm = 1
max {0, ωm1(fs, fm)− ωm2(fs, fm)} , if fm = 0
and
f˙s =
dfs
dt
=

ωs1(fs, fm)− ωs2(fs, fm), if 0 < fs < 1
min {0, ωs1(fs, fm)− ωs2(fs, fm)} , if fs = 1
max {0, ωs1(fs, fm)− ωs2(fs, fm)} , if fs = 0,
where t is time, which is left implicit to simplify notation.
A distribution of economic activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m), is a steady-state if and only if f˙m = f˙s = 0 at
(f ∗s , f
∗
m). A long-run equilibrium is a stable steady-state.
The sufficient conditions for stability are the following:
(i) f ∗x = 0 ⇒ (ωx1 − ωx2) |(f∗s ,f∗m) < 0, for x ∈ {s,m};
(ii) f ∗x = 1 ⇒ (ωx1 − ωx2) |(f∗s ,f∗m) > 0, for x ∈ {s,m};
(iii) f ∗x ∈ (0, 1)∧f ∗y ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ ∂(ωx1−ωx2)∂fx |(f∗s ,f∗m) < 0, for (x, y) ∈ {(s,m), (m, s)};
(iv) (f ∗s , f
∗
m) ∈ (0, 1)2 ⇒ det(J)|(f∗s ,f∗m) > 0 and tr(J)|(f∗s ,f∗m) < 0, where:
J =
 ∂(ωm1−ωm2)∂fm ∂(ωm1−ωm2)∂fs
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
 .
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4.3 The case in which services are non-tradable
In this section, we study the case in which services are asymptotically non-tradable (τs → 0
and, thus, φs → 0).5 This is the case for most services related to arts, entertainment, real
estate, rental, wholesale trade, education and health services.
4.3.1 Short-run equilibrium
We start by computing, for each sector, the difference between the real wages of the skilled
workers in region 1 and region 2 (see Appendix B.2). We obtain:
ωm1 − ωm2 = µmK
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
× (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) (4.19)
and
ωs1 − ωs2 =
µsK
{
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm) (1 + φ2m)
}{
φm
[
f 2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
} (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) ,
(4.20)
where:
K1 = σm (σs − µs) [σm (σs − µs)− σsµm] ,
K2 = σm (σs − µs)
[
σm (σs − µs)
(
1 + φ2m
)− 2µmσs]+ µ2mσ2s (1− φ2m) ,
5We do not consider the limit case because, with τs = 0, the demand of the agricultural workers is
indeterminate when services are concentrated in the other region. When restricted to CS = 0, they are
indifferent between any attainable consumption vector.
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K =
σ1−µmm σ
1−µs
s (1−M − S) (σm − 1)µm (σs − 1)µs
2α
µm
σm−1
m α
µs
σs−1
s βµm+µsM
1− µm
σm−1S−
µs
σs−1
,
ω¯m1 =
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
[
σs(φ
2
m + 1) +
σsµm
σm
(φ2m − 1)− µs (φ2m + 1)
]
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
,
ω¯m2 =
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
[
σs(φ
2
m + 1) +
σsµm
σm
(φ2m − 1)− µs (φ2m + 1)
]
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
,
ω¯s1 =
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm 1−fm(1+φm)1−fm(1−φm)
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
,
ω¯s2 =
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmfm(1+φm)−φmfm(1−φm)+φm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
.
4.3.2 Long-run equilibrium
In this section, we study the long-run equilibrium of the model. The following are possible
spatial equilibrium configurations:
(i) concentration of industry and services in the same region;
(ii) concentration of industry in one region with asymmetric dispersion of services;
(iii) symmetric dispersion of industry and services.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the possible equilibrium solutions. In the vertical axis we have the
share of industrial workers in region 1 and in the horizontal axis we have the share of
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Figure 4.1: Possible equilibrium configurations
service workers in region 1. The possible equilibrium solutions are signaled by black dots.
The black crosses signal configurations which are never an equilibrium.
Concentration of industry and services in the same region
Concentration of the industrial and service activity in region 1, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (1, 1), is a
steady-state if:  (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(1,1) ≥ 0(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(1,1) ≥ 0,
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ (1− , 1]2:  (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≥ 0,(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm) ≥ 0.
Similarly, concentration of the industrial and service activity in region 2, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (0, 0),
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is a steady-state if:  (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(0,0) ≤ 0(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(0,0) ≤ 0,
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ [0, )2:  (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≤ 0,(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm) ≤ 0.
Figure 4.2: Concentration of industry. Figure 4.3: Concentration of services.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the existence of full agglomeration of the industrial and service
activity in one region, when σs ≤ µs + 1.6
In figure 4.2, we assume that all the services are concentrated in region 1, fs = 1, and
we study the relationship between the spatial distribution of industry and the difference
between the real wages of the industrial workers across regions. We find that the real wage
is always higher in region 1. Thus, all industrial workers migrate to region 1.
6To plot these figures, we have set τm = 0.5, µm = 0.4, σm = 4, µs = 0.4 and σs = 1.3.
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In figure 4.3, we assume that all the industry is concentrated in region 1, fm = 1, and we
study how the spatial distribution of services affects the difference between the real wages
of the service sector workers across regions. We find that if the service sector activity in
region 1 is high enough, the service sector workers obtain a higher real wage in region 1.
We conclude that full agglomeration of industry and services is an equilibrium.
Lemma 4.3.1. Concentration of both sectors in a single region is an equilibrium if and
only if σs ≤ µs + 1.
This result (which is proved in appendix B.4) shows that trade costs in the industrial sector
are irrelevant to explain concentration of industry and services activity in a single region,
when the degree of differentiation in the service sector is high and services are non-tradable.
For any value of the trade costs in the industrial sector, a high preference for variety of
services is a sufficient condition to induce full concentration of industry and services. Under
this condition, even if industrial goods are perfectly tradable, all the industrial firms locate
their production in the same region. This contrasts with the results obtained in the classical
model.
From now on, we will frequently assume that σs > µs + 1 (no black-hole condition).
Concentration of industry and asymmetric dispersion of services
Concentration of industrial activity in region 1 with asymmetric dispersion of the service
activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (s, 1), with s ∈ (0.5, 1), is a steady-state if: (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(s,1) ≥ 0(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(s,1) = 0,
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and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ (s− , s+ )× (1− , 1]: (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≥ 0∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
∣∣∣
(fs,fm)
< 0
Similarly, concentration of industrial activity in region 2 with asymmetric dispersion of the
service activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (s, 0), with s ∈ (0, 0.5), is a steady-state if: (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(s,0) ≤ 0(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(s,0) = 0,
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if there exists an  > 0 such that,
∀(fs, fm) ∈ (s− , s+ )× [0, ): (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm) ≤ 0∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
∣∣∣
(fs,fm)
< 0
Figure 4.4: Concentration of industry.
Figure 4.5: Asymmetric dispersion of
services.
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Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate an equilibrium with full concentration of industry and
asymmetric dispersion of services.7
With fs = 0.586, we can see from figure 4.4 that the real wage of the industrial workers is
always higher in region 1. Thus, industrial workers locate in region 1.
In figure 4.5, we assume that all the industrial activity is concentrated in region 1, fm = 1,
and study how the spatial distribution of the service sector activity affects the difference
between the real wages of the service sector workers across regions. The migration of the
service sector workers leads to an equilibrium with fs = 0.586, as the real wages of the
service sector workers coincide.
We conclude that the concentration of industry in region 1 and the asymmetric dispersion
of services (58.6% in region 1) constitutes an equilibrium.
The following lemma describes the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which
the industry is concentrated while the service sector is asymmetrically dispersed.
Lemma 4.3.2. Concentration of industrial activity in region 1 or 2 and asymmetric
dispersion of the service activity is an equilibrium if σs > µs + 1 and:[
σm(1−µsσs )−µm
σm(1−µsσs )+µm
] µs
µs+1−σs
φ
1− µm(σs−1)
(σm−1)(σs−1−µs)
m − φ
2
m[σs(1+µmσm )−µs]+σs(1−
µs
σm
)−µs
2(σs−µs) > 0.
To prove lemma 4.3.2, we use the following result. It states that when the elasticity of
substitution of services is high enough to satisfy what we may call the black-hole condition,
then a movement of service workers to a region decreases the attractiveness of this region
to the service workers.
7To plot these figures, we have set τm = 0.825, µm = 0.4, σm = 4, µs = 0.4 and σs = 4. We have also
set fs = 0.586 in figure 4.4 and fm = 1 in figure 4.5.
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Lemma 4.3.3. When σs > µs + 1, an increase in the share of services in region 1,fs,
decreases the difference between the real wages in the service sector (ωs1 − ωs2).
Symmetric dispersion of industry and services
Symmetric dispersion of the industrial activity and service activity, (f ∗s , f
∗
m) = (0.5, 0.5),
is a steady-state if:  (ωm1 − ωm2) |(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) = 0(ωs1 − ωs2) |(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) = 0,
and it is an equilibrium, that is, a stable steady-state, if det(J)|(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) > 0 and
tr(J)|(fs,fm)=(0.5,0.5) < 0, where J is the Jacobian matrix of the model described by
expressions (4.19) and (4.20):
J =
 ∂(ωm1−ωm2)∂fm ∂(ωm1−ωm2)∂fs
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
 .
The following result implies that all these derivatives are well defined.
Claim 4.3.1. The differences ωm1 − ωm2 and ωs1 − ωs2 are continuous and differentiable
functions of fm and fs, for (fs, fm) ∈ (0, 1).
Symmetric dispersion is always a steady-state.
Lemma 4.3.4. When (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the real wages in the industrial sector and in
the service sector are equal across regions (ωm1 = ωm2 and ωs1 = ωs2).
We already know that ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fs
< 0. Calculating the remaining elements of the Jacobian
matrix, we obtain the following results.
89
CHAPTER 4. A THIRD SECTOR IN THE CORE-PERIPHERY
MODEL:NON-TRADABLE GOODS
Lemma 4.3.5. When (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the migration of service sector workers to
region 1 increases the difference between the real wages of the industrial sector workers
in region 1 and region 2, that is, ∂(ωm1−ωm2)
∂fs
> 0.
Lemma 4.3.6. When (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5), the migration of industrial sector workers to
region 1 increases the difference between the real wages of the service sector workers in
region 1 and region 2, that is, ∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
> 0.
These lemmas are important to explain the stability of the dispersion configuration and the
following figures are useful for an intuitive understanding of the dynamics.8
Figure 4.6: Dispersion of industry. Figure 4.7: Dispersion of services.
Assume that the economy is initially located in point A, with (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5). We
have ωm1 = ωm2 (figure 4.6) and ωs1 = ωs2 (figure 4.7). Consider an increase in the
number of industrial workers in region 1, to fm = 0.8 (point B). From Lemma 4.3.6, an
increase in fm increases ωs1 − ωs2, and thus the curve in figure 4.7 moves up. The service
sector workers would tend to move to region 1, until fs = 0, 56. On the other hand, with
8To plot figures 4.6 and 4.7, we have set µm = 0.4 σm = 4, µs = 0.4, σs = 4 and τm = 0.5.
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fs = 0.56, the curve in figure 4.6 moves up, and the industrial workers would also migrate,
until fm = 0.52. With fm = 0.52, the resulting fs would be lower than 0.56, giving rise to
a new fm, lower than 0.52. It seems that this process continues until (fs, fm) = (0.5, 0.5),
suggesting that symmetric dispersion is an equilibrium.
Figure 4.8: Dispersion becomes unstable. Figure 4.9: Asymmetric dispersion.
We can see from figure 4.8 that dispersion is unstable when τm = 0.99. An increase in fm
increases the difference between the real wages of the industrial workers in region 1 and
region 2, attracting workers from region 2 to region 1. From lemma 4.3.6, an increase in
fm also increases the difference between the real wages in the service sector Therefore, in
the long-run, we will have an asymmetric dispersion of the service sector activity and full
concentration of the industrial activity.
In Appendix B.4 we calculate the Jacobian matrix. Here, we compute det(J) and tr(J)
using a numerical example. Figure 4.10 illustrates a case in which symmetric dispersion of
the industrial and service activity is an equilibrium for low values of φm.10
9To plot figures 4.8 and 4.9, we have set µm = 0.4 σm = 4, µs = 0.4, σs = 4 and τm = 0.9. Additionally,
we have set fs = 0.5 to plot figure 4.8 and fm = 1 to plot figure 4.9.
10In figures 4.10 and 4.11, it is also assumed that σm = 4, σs = 4, µm = 0.4 and µs = 4.
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For the parameter values in our numerical example, tr(J) is negative for any φm ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, the sign of the determinant is crucial for the stability. From figure 4.10, we can
see that det(J) is positive for low values of φm. This means that the eigenvalues of J have
negative real parts and symmetric dispersion of industry and services is an equilibrium.
For high values of φm, the symmetric dispersion becomes unstable. In this case, asymmetric
dispersion of the service activity with full concentration of the industrial activity in one
region becomes the equilibrium.
Figure 4.10: Det(J) as a function of φm. Figure 4.11: Threshold value for φm.
This result can be viewed in figure 4.11, where we also plot the “asymmetric condition”
in lemma 4.3.2, as a function of φm. When φm is higher than φ∗m, concentration of all
industrial activity in one region with asymmetric dispersion of the service activity becomes
an equilibrium. Therefore, point A is a threshold value for φm.
In particular, when σs > µs + 1, the economy can have two distinct equilibrium
configurations. For high trade costs (low φm), we find that symmetric dispersion of
services and industry is an equilibrium, while for low trade costs (high φm), we find that
concentration of industry with asymmetric dispersion of services is an equilibrium.
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Configurations which are never an equilibrium
We also show that the following configurations are never an equilibrium:
(i) concentration of services and concentration of industry in different regions;
(ii) symmetric dispersion of services and concentration of industry;
(iii) concentration of services together with dispersion of industry.
Lemma 4.3.7. Concentration of each sector in different regions is never an equilibrium.
Lemma 4.3.8. Symmetric dispersion of services and concentration of industry is never an
equilibrium.
Lemma 4.3.9. Concentration of services together with dispersion of industry is never an
equilibrium.
4.4 The case in which services are tradable
In this section we show, numerically, that a different spatial configuration of economic
activity, concentration of services with dispersion of industry, can appear when services are
tradable (0 < φs ≤ φm < 1).
Consider an initial equilibrium, in which both industry and services are concentrated in
region 1. Figure 4.12 illustrates how a decrease in the trade cost of services (an increase in
τs) affects the spatial distribution of industry, when all services are concentrated in region 1
(point A). The main result is that a fall in the trade cost of services leads to an equilibrium
in which industry becomes asymmetrically dispersed (point C), while the service sector
remains concentrated in region 1 (see figure 4.13).11
11To plot figures 4.12 and 4.13, we have set τm = 0.5, µm = 0.4 σm = 4, µs = 0.4, σs = 1.3. We also set
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Figure 4.12: Industry becomes dispersed. Figure 4.13: Concentration of services.
The same decrease in the trade cost of services (from τs → 0 to τs = 0.4) may not change
the initial equilibrium configuration, being compatible with symmetric dispersion of both
sectors (set τm = 0.5, keeping fixed the remaining parameters) or asymmetric dispersion of
services with full concentration of industry (set τm = 0.825).
4.5 Concluding remarks
We have extended the footloose entrepreneur model (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003) to allow
for a third sector: a monopolistic competitive sector of services, assumed to be non-tradable
across regions.
We find that the strength of the preference for variety of services is crucial to explain the
spatial distribution of the industrial and service activity. When the elasticity of substitution
among services is below a certain threshold, full concentration of industry and services
fs = 1 in figure 4.12 and fm = 1 in figure 4.13.
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in a single region is always an equilibrium. But this threshold value for the elasticity of
substitution among services seems a bit too low to be attainable in modern economies, as
it corresponds to a very high price markup over marginal cost.12 Based on this model, we
should not expect, therefore, full concentration of industry and services in a single region.
With a higher elasticity of substitution among services, which is more likely, the spatial
distribution of economic activity depends on the trade costs in the industrial sector. If
these trade costs are high, symmetric dispersion of the services and industrial activity is
an equilibrium. If they are low, concentration of industry with asymmetric dispersion of
services is an equilibrium (in this case, the industrialized region has more than 50% of the
service sector activity).
Taking into account the existence of non-tradable goods, with specialized workers which
are mobile across regions, should provide new insights about the determinants of the spatial
organization of economic activity. We hope that this model may be seen as a step in this
direction.
12With services representing 50% of the economic activity (µs = 0.5), at this threshold (σs = 1 + µs), we
obtain ps = σsσs−1β = 3β (the price of a representative service is equal to 3 times the marginal cost). A lower
price markup is obtained if we consider a higher elasticity of substitution among services.
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Appendix B
Mathematical proofs
B.1 Short-run equilibrium
The nominal wages of the industrial and service sector workers are:
Wmi =
µm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φmMj
+
Yjφm
φmMi +Mj
)
, (B.1)
Wsi =
µs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φsSj
+
Yjφs
φsSi + Sj
)
. (B.2)
The regional nominal incomes are:
Yi =
1−H − S
2
+WmiMi +WsiSi. (B.3)
Our goal in this section is to find Wmi and Wsi as functions of the parameters of the model. First,
we determine Yi and Yj . Then, we substitute these into Wmi and Wsi.
APPENDIX B. MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
Substituting (B.1) and (B.2) in (B.3), and using a = 1−H−S2 , we obtain:
Yi = a+Mi
µm
σm
(
Yi
Mi + φmMj
+
Yjφm
φmMi +Mj
)
+ Si
µs
σs
(
Yi
Si + φsSj
+
Yjφs
φsSi + Sj
)
.
Rearranging, we obtain Yi as a function of Yj :
Yi
[
1− µmMi
σm (Mi + φmMj)
− µsSi
σs (Si + φsSj)
]
=
= a+
[
µmMiφm
σm (φmMi +Mj)
+
µsSiφs
σs (φsSi + Sj)
]
Yj .
For convenience, define:
bm = φmMi +Mj ,
cm = Mi + φmMj ,
bs = φsSi + Sj ,
cs = Si + φsSj .
With some manipulation, we obtain:
Yi
σmcmσscs − µmMiσscs − µsSiσmcm
σmcmσscs
= a+
µmMiφmσsbs + µsSiφsσmbm
σsbsσmbm
Yj .
This is equivalent to:
Yi =
aσmσscmcs + (µmMiφmσsbs + Siµsφsσmbm) cmcsb
−1
m b
−1
s Yj
σmcm (σscs − Siµs)−Miµmσscs . (B.4)
The above equation yields Yi as a function of Yj . By symmetry, we can write Yj as function of Yi as
follows:
Yj =
aσmσsbmbs + (µmMjφmσscs + Sjµsφsσmcm) bmbsc
−1
m c
−1
s Yi
σmbm (σsbs − Sjµs)−Mjµmσsbs . (B.5)
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Substituting (B.5) in (B.4) and simplifying, we obtain:
Yi =
cmcs [σmbm (σsbs − Sjµs)−Mjµmσsbs +Miµmφmσsbs + Siµsφsσmbm]
a−1σ−1m σ−1s R
, (B.6)
and, by symmetry:
Yj =
bmbs [σmcm (σscs − Siµs)−Miµmσscs +Mjµmφmσscs + Sjµsφsσmcm]
a−1σ−1m σ−1s R
, (B.7)
where:
R = [σmcm (σscs − Siµs)−Miµmσscs] [σmbm (σsbs − Sjµs)−Mjµmσsbs]−
− (Miµmφmσsbs + Siµsφsσmbm) (Mjµmφmσscs + Sjµsφsσmcm) .
Denoting by Y Ni and Y
N
j the numerators of Yi and Yj in equations (B.6) and (B.7), we can rewrite
(B.1) in the following way:
Wmi =
µmσsa
cmbmR
(
Y Ni bm + φmY
N
j cm
)
.
Replacing the expressions for Yi and Yj , and setting i = 1 and j = 2, we obtain:
Wm1 =
µmaσmσs
R
[ csbm (σsbs − S2µs)−M2csσ−1m µmσsbs +M1csσ−1m µmφmσsbs +
+ S1µsφscsbm + φmbscm (σscs − S1µs)−M1φmbsµmσsσ−1m cs +
+ M2φ
2
mbsµmσsσ
−1
m cs + S2φmbsµsφscm ] .
Denoting C = µmcsbsσsaR , and replacing bm, cm, bs and cs by the corresponding expressions:
Wm1
C
= σm (φmM1 +M2)
(
σs − µsS2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
)
+ µmσs (φmM1 −M2) +
+ φm
[
σm (M1 + φmM2)
(
σs − µsS1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
)
+ µmσs(φmM2 −M1)
]
.
101
APPENDIX B. MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
Manipulating:
Wm1
C
= φmσmM1
[
2σs − µs
(
S2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
+
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
)]
+
+M2
[
σmσs
(
φ2m + 1
)
+ σsµm
(
φ2m − 1
)− σmµs(φ2mS1 − φsS2S1 + φsS2 + S2 − φsS1S2 + φsS1
)]
.
It is easy to show that:
S2 − φsS1
φsS1 + S2
+
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
=
2S1S2
(
1− φ2s
)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs
(
S21 + S
2
2
) .
Substituting this expression, we determine Wm1 and (by symmetry) Wm2:
Wm1
Cσm
= 2φmM1
[
σs − µs
S1S2
(
1− φ2s
)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs
(
S21 + S
2
2
)]+
+M2
[
σs
(
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
φ2m −
µm
σm
)
− µs
(
φ2m
S1 − φsS2
S1 + φsS2
+
S2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
)]
(B.8)
and
Wm2
Cσm
= 2φmM2
[
σs − µs
S1S2
(
1− φ2s
)
S1S2 (1 + φ2s) + φs
(
S21 + S
2
2
)]+
+M1
[
σs
(
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
φ2m −
µm
σm
)
− µs
(
φ2m
S2 − φsS1
S2 + φsS1
+
S1 − φsS2)
S1 + φsS2
)]
, (B.9)
where:
C =
µmcsbsσsa
R
=
µmσsa
R
(S1 + φsS2)(S2 + φsS1),
and:
R = {σm (M1 + φmM2) [σs (S1 + φsS2)− S1µs]−M1µmσs (S1 + φsS2)} ×
× {σm (φmM1 +M2) [σs (φsS1 + S2)− S2µs]−M2µmσs (φsS1 + S2)} −
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− [M1µmφmσs (φsS1 + S2) + S1µsφsσm (φmM1 +M2)]×
× [M2µmφmσs (S1 + φsS2) + S2µsφsσm (M1 + φmM2)] .
Equations (B.8) and (B.9) are explicit functions of the parameters of the model.
By analogy, we find the nominal wages in the service sector:
Ws1
Dσs
= 2φsS1
[
σm − µm
M1M2
(
1− φ2m
)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm
(
M21 +M
2
2
)]+
+ S2
[
σm
(
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
φ2s −
µs
σs
)
− µm
(
φ2s
M1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
+
M2 − φmM1
M2 + φmM1
)]
(B.10)
and
Ws2
Dσs
= 2φsS2
[
σm − µm
M1M2
(
1− φ2m
)
M1M2 (1 + φ2m) + φm
(
M21 +M
2
2
)]+
+ S1
[
σm
(
φ2s + 1 +
µs
σs
φ2s −
µs
σs
)
− µm
(
φ2s
M2 − φmM1
M2 + φmM1
+
M1 − φmM2)
M1 + φmM2
)]
, (B.11)
where:
D =
µscmbmσma
R
=
µsσma
R
(M1 + φmM2)(M2 + φmM1),
and:
R = {σm (M1 + φmM2) [σs (S1 + φsS2)− S1µs]−M1µmσs (S1 + φsS2)} ×
× {σm (φmM1 +M2) [σs (φsS1 + S2)− S2µs]−M2µmσs (φsS1 + S2)} −
− [M1µmφmσs (φsS1 + S2) + S1µsφsσm (φmM1 +M2)]×
× [M2µmφmσs (S1 + φsS2) + S2µsφsσm (M1 + φmM2)] .
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B.2 Short-run equilibrium with τs → 0
With τs → 0, equations (4.13), (4.15), (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18) become:
Wm1 =
µm
σmM
[
Y1
fm + φm(1− fm) +
φmY2
φmfm + 1− fm
]
Wm2 =
µm
σmM
[
Y2
1− fm + φmfm +
φmY1
φm(1− fm) + fm
]
Ws1 =
µsY1
σsSfs
Ws2 =
µsY2
σsS(1− fs)
Y1 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm1Mfm +Ws1Sfs
Y2 =
1−M − S
2
+Wm2M(1− fm) +Ws2S(1− fs)
P1 = ρ [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
P2 = ρ [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs .
From (B.8)-(B.11), considering φS → 0, we compute the nominal wages of the workers in each
region:
Wm1
C0σm
= 2φmM1 (σs − µs) +M2
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
, (B.12)
Wm2
C0σm
= 2φmM2 (σs − µs) +M1
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
, (B.13)
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Ws1
D0σs
= S2
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmM2 − φmM1
φmM1 +M2
]
, (B.14)
Ws2
D0σs
= S1
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µmM1 − φmM2
M1 + φmM2
]
, (B.15)
where
C0 =
µmS1S2
R0σm
,
D0 =
µs(M1 + φmM2)(φmM1 +M2)
R0σs
,
and
R0 =
S1S2
aσmσs
{ [σm (M1 + φmM2) (σs − µs)−M1µmσs]×
× [σm (φmM1 +M2) (σs − µs)−M2µmσs]−M1M2µ2mφ2mσ2s } .
Dividing the nominal wages in the industrial sector, (B.12) and (B.13), by the regional price level,
we obtain the real wages of the industrial workers:
ωm1 =
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
Rm [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
(B.16)
and
ωm2 =
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
1 + φ2m
)}
Rm [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
, (B.17)
where
Rm =
ρM
aµmσmσs
{ {σm [fm + φm(1− fm)] (σs − µs)− fmµmσs} ×
× {σm [φmfm + (1− fm)] (σs − µs)− (1− fm)µmσs} − fm(1− fm)µ2mφ2mσ2s } .
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With some manipulation, we find that the difference between the real wages in the industrial sector
can be written as:
ωm1 − ωm2 = µmK
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
(ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) , (B.18)
where:
K =
σ1−µmm σ1−µss (1−M − S) (σm − 1)µm (σs − 1)µs
2α
µm
σm−1
m α
µs
σs−1
s βµm+µsM
1− µm
σm−1S−
µs
σs−1
,
K1 = σm (σs − µs) [σm (σs − µs)− σsµm] ,
K2 = σm (σs − µs)
[
σm (σs − µs)
(
1 + φ2m
)− 2µmσs]+ µ2mσ2s (1− φ2m) ,
ω¯m1 =
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
µs
1−σs
s
,
ω¯m2 =
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
.
Similarly, for the service sector, dividing the nominal wages in the service sector, (B.14) and (B.15),
by the regional price level, we obtain the real wages of the service workers:
ωs1 =
[fm + φm(1− fm)] [φmfm + 1− fm]
[
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
− µm 1−fm−φmfm1−fm+φmfm
]
Rs [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
and:
ωs2 =
[fm + φm(1− fm)] [φmfm + 1− fm]
[
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
− µmfm−φm(1−fm)fm+φm(1−fm)
]
Rs [φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
,
where
Rs =
ρS
aσmσs
{ [σm [fm + φm(1− fm)] (σs − µs)− fmµmσs]×
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× [σm (φmfm + 1− fm) (σs − µs)− (1− fm)µmσs]− fm(1− fm)µ2mφ2mσ2s } .
Again, after some manipulation, we write the real wage differential in the service sector as:
ωs1 − ωs2 =
µsK
{
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm)
(
1 + φ2m
)}
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
(ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) (B.19)
where:
ω¯s1 =
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
− µm 1−fm(1+φm)1−fm(1−φm)
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
;
ω¯s2 =
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
− µmfm(1+φm)−φmfm(1−φm)+φm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
.
B.3 Proof of claim 4.3.1
Inspection of the expressions for ωm1−ωm2 and ωs1−ωs2 shows that continuity of these differences
and their derivatives depends on the denominator in (B.18) not being zero. This is the case since K1
and K2 are positive. 
B.4 Proof of lemmas
B.4.1 Lemma 4.3.1
Since regions are symmetric, we only study concentration in region 1.
When the workers become concentrated in region 1, Rm in (B.16) and (B.17), converges to:
lim
fm→1−
Rm =
ρMφm
aµmσs
(σmσs − µsσm − µmσs) (σs − µs) > 0.
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Therefore, from (B.16) and (B.17), we have:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm1 =
2φm (σs − µs)
lim(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)Rm
=
2aµmσs
ρM (σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) ,
while:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm2 =
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
1 + φ2m
)
lim(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)Rmφ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
.
The numerator is positive, while the denominator goes to infinity. Thus:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm2 = 0.
We conclude that the industrial workers remain concentrated, as:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm1 > lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωm2.
In the service sector, real wages in region 1 tend to:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωs1 = lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
φm(1− fs)
[
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
+ µm
]
Rs
.
Notice that:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
Rs
φm(1− fs) =
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) (σs − µs) .
Therefore:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωs1 = lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
+ µm
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) (σs − µs)
> 0,
while:
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
ωs2 =
φ
1−σm−µm
1−σm
m
[
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
− µm
]
lim(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)Rs(1− fs)
µs
1−σs
=
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=
τµmm
[
σm
(
1− µsσs
)
− µm
]
ρS
aσs
(σmσs − σmµs − µmσs) (σs − µs)
lim
(fm,fs)→(1−,1−)
(1− fs)
σs−1−µs
1−σs .
The real wage of the service workers in the empty region tends to zero if σs < 1 + µs and to plus
infinity if σs > 1 + µs. Notice also that with σs = 1 + µs, we have ωs1 > ωs2 (in the limit).
We conclude that concentration of both sectors in a single region is an equilibrium if and only if
σs ≤ 1 + µs. 
B.4.2 Lemma 4.3.2
Since regions are symmetric, we only study the case in which all the industrial activity is
concentrated in region 1.
When fm = 1, the difference between the real wages of the service sector workers in (B.19) is:
ωs1 − ωs2 = µsK
K1
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
f
1− µs
σs−1
s
− σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
 .
We begin our proof by calculating the values of fs ∈ (0, 1) for which ωs1 − ωs2 = 0. Since K and
K1 are strictly positive and finite:
0 =
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
f
1− µs
σs−1
s
− σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
⇔
⇔ 1− fs
fs
=
 σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
]

σs−1
σs−1−µs
. (B.20)
Simplifying we obtain:
fs =
1{
σm(1−µsσs )−µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1−µsσs )+µm
]
} σs−1
σs−1−µs
+ 1
.
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Notice that since φ
µm
1−σm
m > 1, we have:
0 <
σm(1− µsσs )− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
] < 1.
Therefore, since σs > µs + 1, we have:
0 <
 σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
]

σs−1
σs−1−µs
< 1
and
1
2
< fs < 1.
It remains to verify the equilibrium condition for the industrial sector.
When the skilled workers in the industrial sector are concentrated in region 1, the difference between
the real wages of the industrial workers in (B.18) is:
ωm1 − ωm2 =
=
µmK
φmK1
2φm(σs − µs)
f
µs
1−σs
s
−
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
 .
Then, ωm1 − ωm2 > 0 if and only if:
2φm(σs − µs)
f
µs
1−σs
s
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
φ
µm
1−σm
m (1− fs)
µs
1−σs
⇔
⇔
(
1− fs
fs
) µs
1−σs
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
2φm(σs − µs)φ
µm
1−σm
m
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Replacing equation (B.20), we obtain: σm(1−
µs
σs
)− µm
φ
µm
1−σm
m
[
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
]

−µs
σs−1−µs
>
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m + 1)
]
− µs(φ2m + 1)
2(σs − µs)φ
µm
1−σm+1
m
.
Rearranging we have: [
σm(1− µsσs )− µm
σm(1− µsσs ) + µm
] −µs
σs−1−µs
φ
1− µm(σs−1)
(σm−1)(σs−1−µs)
m
−
φ2m
[
σs(1 +
µm
σm
)− µs
]
+ σs(1− µsσm )− µs
2(σs − µs) > 0.
Concentration of all the industrial activity in a region and asymmetric dispersion of the service
activity is a steady-state when the above condition is satisfied. Lemma 4.3.3 provides the stability
condition, guaranteeing that it is an equilibrium. 
B.4.3 Lemma 4.3.3
From equation (B.19), the sign of ∂(ωs1−ωs2)∂fs is equal to the sign of
∂(ω¯s1−ω¯s2)
∂fs
.
Calculating the partial derivatives:
∂ω¯s1
∂fs
=
(
−1 + µs
σs − 1
) σm (1− µsσs)− µm 1−fm(1+φm)1−fm(1−φm)
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm
f
−2+ µs
σs−1
s ,
∂ω¯s2
∂fs
=
(
1− µs
σs − 1
) σm (1− µsσs)− µmfm(1+φm)−φmfm(1−φm)+φm
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm
(1− fs)−2+
µs
σs−1 .
With σs > µs + 1, we find that, for fs ∈ (0, 1):
∂ω¯s1
∂fs
< 0,
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∂ω¯s2
∂fs
> 0.
When fs ∈ {0, 1}, one of these partial derivatives is null, but we still have ∂ω¯s1
∂fs
<
∂ω¯s2
∂fs
. 
B.4.4 Lemma 4.3.4
When (fs, fm) = (12 ,
1
2), we have ω¯m1 = ω¯m2 and ω¯s1 = ω¯s2.
Therefore, we also have ωm1 = ωm2 and ωs1 = ωs2. 
B.4.5 Lemma 4.3.5
We want to prove that ∂(ωm1−ωm2)∂fs > 0.
From (B.18), we know that the sign of ∂(ω¯m1−ω¯m2)∂fs is the same.
Calculating the partial derivatives:
∂ω¯m1
∂fs
=
2φmfm (σs − µs) + (1− fm)
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
σs−1
µs
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
,
∂ω¯m2
∂fs
= −
2φm(1− fm) (σs − µs) + fm
{
σs
[
φ2m + 1 +
µm
σm
(φ2m − 1)
]
− µs
(
φ2m + 1
)}
σs−1
µs
[φmfm + (1− fm)]
µm
1−σm (1− fs)1−
µs
σs−1
.
Substituting (fs, fm) = (12 ,
1
2), we find that:
∂ (ω¯m1 − ω¯m2)
∂fs
=
2φm (σs − µs)
σs−1
µs
[
1
2(1 + φm)
] µm
1−σm 2−1+
µs
σs−1
> 0.

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B.4.6 Lemma 4.3.6
We want to prove that ∂(ωs1−ωs2)∂fm > 0. Using equation (B.19), we determine the partial derivative:
∂(ωs1 − ωs2)
∂fm
=
∂
∂fm
µsK
{
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm)
(
1 + φ2m
)}
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
 (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
+
∂ (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
∂fm
µsK
{
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
+ fm (1− fm)
(
1 + φ2m
)}
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
 .
Since we are evaluating the derivative at (fs, fm) = (12 ,
1
2), the first term disappears:
∂(ωs1 − ωs2)
∂fm
=
∂ (ω¯s1 − ω¯s2)
∂fm
[
µsK
(
2φm + 1 + φ
2
m
)
2φmK1 +K2
]
.
The partial derivative of ω¯s1 with respect to fm is:
∂ω¯s1
∂fm
=
1
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
×
× µm (1 + φm) [1− fm(1− φm)] + (φm − 1) [1− fm(1 + φm)]
[1− fm(1− φm)]2
+
+
1{
[fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm f
1− µs
σs−1
s
}2 ×
× µm
σm − 1 [fm + (1− fm)φm]
µm
1−σm−1 f
1− µs
σs−1
s (1− φm)×
×
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm 1− fm (1 + φm)
1− fm (1− φm)
]
.
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Substituting (fs, fm) = (12 ,
1
2):
∂ω¯s1
∂fm
∣∣∣∣
(fs,fm)=( 12 ,
1
2)
=
µm
[
(1 + φm)
(
1
2 +
1
2φm
)
+ (φm − 1)
(
1
2 − 12φm
)](
1
2 +
1
2φm
) µm
1−σm 2−1+
µs
σs−1
(
1
2 +
1
2φm
)2 +
+
µm
σm−1
(
1
2 +
1
2φm
) µm
1−σm−1 2−1+
µs
σs−1 (1− φm)[(
1
2 +
1
2φm
) µm
1−σm 2−1+
µs
σs−1
]2
[
σm
(
1− µs
σs
)
− µm
1
2 − 12φm
1
2 +
1
2φm
]
.
Both terms are positive, therefore, ∂ωs1∂fm > 0.
By symmetry, ωs2∂fm = −∂ωs1∂fm . Hence, we conclude that
∂(ωs1−ωs2)
∂fm
∣∣∣
fm=fs=
1
2
is positive. 
B.4.7 Lemma 4.3.7
Since regions are symmetric, we only need to study the case in which industry is concentrated in
region 1 and services are concentrated in region 2. We look at points near (fm, fs) = (1, 0) and at
what happens when first fm → 1 and then fs → 0.
The difference between the real wages in the industrial sector when all the industry is located in
region 1 and all the services are located in region 2 is:
ωm1 − ωm2 = K
K1
(ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) .
Notice that the constants K and K1 are strictly positive and finite.
Observe also that when (fm, fs) = (1, 0), we have ω¯m1 = 0 and ω¯m2 > 0. Therefore, ωm1 < ωm2.
Concentration of each sector in a different region is never an equilibrium. 
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B.4.8 Lemma 4.3.8
Since regions are symmetric, it is enough to study the case in which services are symmetrically
dispersed while the industry is concentrated in region 1.
The difference between the real wages in the service sector when fs = 0.5 and fm = 1 is:
ωs1 − ωs2 = 4µsK
K1
(ω¯s1 − ω¯s2) .
The constants K and K1 are strictly positive and finite.
With (fs, fm) =
(
1
2 , 1
)
, we have ω¯s2 = ω¯s1φ
µm
σm−1
m < ω¯s1. Therefore, ωs2 < ωs1.
Symmetric dispersion of services with concentration of industry cannot be an equilibrium. 
B.4.9 Lemma 4.3.9
Since regions are symmetric, it is enough to study the case in which industry is dispersed while
services are concentrated in region 2 (fs = 0).
From expression (B.18), the difference between the real wages in the industrial sector is:
ωm1 − ωm2 = µmK
φm
[
f2m + (1− fm)2
]
K1 + (1− fm) fmK2
(ω¯m1 − ω¯m2) .
With fs = 0, we have ω¯m1 = 0 and ω¯m2 > 0.
This implies that ωm1 < ωm2, because K, K1 and K2 are strictly positive and finite.
Dispersion of industry with concentration of services cannot be an equilibrium. 
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The core-periphery model with technology
advantage
CHAPTER 5. THE CORE-PERIPHERY MODEL WITH TECHNOLOGY
ADVANTAGE
5.1 Introduction
In general, core-periphery models assume that regions have the same preferences and
technology. In such framework, all consumers share the same utility function and firms
produce using the same technology (see for example, Krugman, 1991 and Puga, 1999).
The same technology is represented by the idea that each firm in each region has an identical
cost function, which includes a fixed cost and a variable cost. More precisely, all industrial
firms in each region support a fixed cost of α units of a particular factor of production and
a variable cost.
In this paper, we assume that a region has a priori a technological advantage, in which all
firms have lower fixed costs. This means that they use less α units of skilled labor than all
firms in the other region, to produce one unit of good.
A related paper was developed by Behrens and Thisse (2006) in which an economy is
formed by two countries with different set-up costs and entry conditions. In this case,
contrary to our model, countries have also different endowment sizes (as labor and capital),
and consumers are immobile and supply labor locally, whereas capital is perfectly mobile.
Our model generalizes the analytically solvable core-periphery model of Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003) incorporating a technology advantage for all industrial firms operating in
one of the regions. We study how this technology advantage affects the spatial distribution
of the economic activity and the welfare of the interest groups in the economy.
We find evidence that industrial activity in a region is enhanced, ceteris paribus, by lower
home fixed costs and by higher foreign fixed costs. From the point of view of welfare, we
conclude that all skilled workers in a region are better off if the technology advantage arise
from a decrease (increase) in the home (foreign) fixed costs. Relatively to the welfare of
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the unskilled workers, we conclude that a technology advantage in a region increases the
welfare of the unskilled workers in both regions if there is a fall in one of the fixed costs.
5.2 The model
5.2.1 Basic setup
The model is an extension of the analytically solvable core-periphery model of Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003) that incorporates a technology advantage for all industrial firms operating
in one of the regions. The technology advantage consists in modelling a region with a lower
fixed cost.
The economy comprises two regions and two sectors: an agricultural sector, and an
industrial sector. There are two factors of production: unskilled workers (L) and skilled
workers (M ). The unskilled workers are immobile across regions, while the skilled workers
are mobile.
We denote by M1 and M2, with M1 + M2 = M , the supply of skilled workers in
regions 1 and 2, respectively. The supply of unskilled workers is the same in each region,
L1 = L2 = L/2. The total population is normalized to unity, L+M = 1.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale using only unskilled labor. Transportation of agricultural output
across regions is costless. The industrial sector produces a horizontally differentiated
product using skilled labor (fixed cost) and unskilled labor (variable cost).
Transportation of industrial goods is subject to iceberg transportation costs. For each unit
of industrial good that is shipped to the other region, only a fraction τ , with 0 < τ < 1
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arrives.
All the agents have the same preferences for consumption of industrial goods (CM ), and
agricultural goods (CA). The preferences are represented by the following utility function:
U = CµMC
1−µ
A ,
CM =
[
n∑
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
i
] σ
σ−1
,
where µ ∈ (0, 1), is the share of spending on industrial products; n is the number of varieties
of industrial goods; ci is the consumption of the industrial good produced by firm i; and,
finally, σ > 1 is the elasticities of substitution among industrial goods.
5.2.2 Supply
Agricultural sector
In the agricultural sector, firms use unskilled labor to produce a homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale. The production function is qA = L, where qA is the amount
of agricultural goods produced and L is the quantity of unskilled labor employed. The
cost function is CTA = WLqA, where WL is the nominal wage of the unskilled workers
employed. The profit function is:
ΠA = (pA −WL)qA,
where pA is the price of an agricultural good, taken as given by the firms (perfect
competition) and chosen to be the numeraire (pA = 1).
The sector is perfectly competitive, therefore:
WL = pA = 1.
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Industrial sector
All industrial firms in region i, for i ∈ {1, 2} support a fixed cost of αi units of skilled labor,
with α1 ≤ α2, and a variable cost of β units of unskilled labor per unit of good produced.
Since WL = 1, the cost function for all firms in region i is CTi = αiWi + βqi, where qi
is the quantity of industrial goods produced by an industrial firm in region i and Wi is the
nominal wage of the industrial workers in region i.
The profit function for all manufacturing firms in region i is:
Πi = pi(qi)qi − βqi − αiWi. (5.1)
Firms choose qi to maximize profit. This implies that:
pi =

− 1β,
where  is the price-elasticity of demand.
Since there is a large number of firms in the industrial sector,  ≈ σm (we have equality if
there is an infinite number of firms). Thus:1
pi =
σ
σ − 1β. (5.2)
Given the assumption of free entry, the profit of each firm must be zero. Substituting (5.2)
in (5.1), we obtain:
qi =
αi
β
(σ − 1)Wi. (5.3)
1In the case of Cournot competition: 1 =
1
σ + s(1 − 1σ ), where s is the market share of each firm. With
many firms in the economy (s ≈ 0), the price elasticity of demand, , is approximately equal to the elasticity
of substitution among the differentiated goods, σ.
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Since an industrial firm in region i employs αi units of skilled labor, the total demand for
skilled labor in region i is niαi. Therefore, the number of firms in region i must be:
ni =
Mi
αi
. (5.4)
5.2.3 Demand
Industrial sector
Each industrial firm sells its products in both regions. The price of a representative local
industrial good is pii = βσσ−1 , and the price of a product that is exported from region i to
region j is pij = τ−1 βσσ−1 , where 0 < τ < 1 is the transportation cost of industrial goods
2.
Since all industrial firms of a region set the same price, the industrial price index in region
i is:
Pi =
[
nipii
1−σ + njpij1−σ
] 1
1−σ =
=
βσ
σ − 1
(
ni + njτ
σm−1) 11−σ ,
where ni and nj are the number of industrial firms in regions i and j, respectively.
Defining φ = τσ−1 as the degree of economic integration for the industrial sector (see
Baldwin et al., 2003), we obtain:
Pi =
βσ
σ − 1 (ni + njφ)
1
1−σ . (5.5)
2Transportation cost of industrial goods is subject to iceberg transportation costs. For each unit of
industrial good that is shipped to the other region, only a fraction 0 < τ < 1 arrives.
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Denoting by Cij the total demand of an industrial product that is produced in region i and
consumed in region j, we have:
Cii =
p−σii
P 1−σi
µYi and Cij =
p−σij
P 1−σj
µYj,
where Yi and Yj are the nominal incomes in regions i and j, respectively.
Since pii = βσσ−1 and pij = τ
−1 βσ
σ−1 , the above equations become:
Cii =
(
βσ
σ−1
)−σ
P 1−σi
µYi and Cij =
τσ
(
βσ
σ−1
)−σ
P 1−σj
µYj. (5.6)
Denoting by qi the output of an industrial firm in region i, we have:
qi = Cii + τ
−1Cij. (5.7)
Substituting (5.6) in (5.7), we obtain:
qi = µ
(
βσ
σ − 1
)−σ(
Yi
P 1−σMi
+
τσ−1Yj
P 1−σj
)
. (5.8)
Replacing (5.5) in (5.8):
qi = µ
σ − 1
βσ
(
Yi
ni + φnj
+
φYj
φni + nj
)
.
Substituting (5.3) and (5.4) above, we obtain the nominal wage of the skilled workers in
each region:
W1 =
µ
α1σ
(
Y1
1
α1
M1 +
φ
α2
M2
+
φY2
φ
α1
M1 +
1
α2
M2
)
,
and
W2 =
µ
α1σ
(
Y2
1
α2
M2 +
φ
α1
M1
+
φY1
φ
α2
M2 +
1
α1
M1
)
.
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Considering α = α1
α2
as the ratio between the fixed costs, above equations become:
W1 =
µ
σ
(
Y1
M1 + φαM2
+
φY2
φM1 + αM2
)
, (5.9)
and
W2 =
µ
σ
(
Y2
M2 +
φ
α
M1
+
φY1
φM2 +
1
α
M1
)
. (5.10)
Regional income, perfect price index
The nominal income in region i, Yi, is equal to the sum of the incomes in the agricultural
and industrial sector:
Yi =
L
2
+WiMi, for i = 1, 2. (5.11)
The perfect price index of region, Pi, aggregates two price indices: the price index of the
agricultural sector (normalized to 1) and the price index of the industrial sector, PMi .
We obtain the perfect price index in region i, substituting (5.4) into (5.5):
P1 =
βσ
σ − 1
(
1
α1
) µ
1−σ
(M1 + φαM2)
µ
1−σ , (5.12)
and
P2 =
βσ
σ − 1
(
1
α2
) µ
1−σ
(
M2 +
φ
α
M1
) µ
1−σ
. (5.13)
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5.2.4 Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run, workers are immobile across regions. A short-run equilibrium consists in
the equality of supply and demand. Aggregate prices, output and wages are endogenously
determined.
Equations (5.9), (5.10), (5.11), (5.12) and (5.13) determine the short-run equilibrium of the
model. Here we recall these equations:
W1 =
µ
σ
(
Y1
M1 + φαM2
+
φY2
φM1 + αM2
)
,
W2 =
µ
σ
(
Y2
M2 +
φ
α
M1
+
φY1
φM2 +
1
α
M1
)
,
Y1 =
L
2
+W1M1,
Y2 =
L
2
+W2M2,
P1 =
βσ
σ − 1
(
1
α1
) µ
1−σ
(M1 + φαM2)
µ
1−σ ,
P2 =
βσ
σ − 1
(
1
α2
) µ
1−σ
(
M2 +
φ
α
M1
) µ
1−σ
.
Simplifying this system of equations3 we find the ratio between the real wages:
ω1
ω2
=
W1
P1
W2
P2
= α
µ
1−σ
W1
W2
(
M2 +
φ
α
M1
) µ
1−σ
(M1 + φαM2)
µ
1−σ
, (5.14)
3see appendix C.1 for detailed calculations.
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where:
W1
W2
=
(
φM2 +
1
α
M1
) (
σ
µ
− M2
M2+
φ
α
M1
)
+ φM2
[2φM2+ 1α(1+φ2)M1](M1+αφM2)
[2φM1+α(1+φ2)M2](M2+ φαM1)
[2φM2+ 1α (1+φ2)M1](M1+φαM2)
[2φM1+α(1+φ2)M2](M2+ φαM1)
(φM1 + αM2)
(
σ
µ
− M1
M1+φαM2
)
+ φM1
Defining the share of the skilled workers in region 1 by f = M1
M1+M2
, (5.14) becomes:
ω1
ω2
= α
µ
1−σ
[
(1− f) + φ
α
f
] µ
1−σ
[f + φα(1− f)] µ1−σ
×
×
[
φ(1− f) + 1
α
f
] [
σ
µ
− (1−f)
(1−f)+ φ
α
f
]
+ φ(1− f) [2φ(1−f)+
1
α(1+φ2)f][f+αφ(1−f)]
[2φf+α(1+φ2)(1−f)][(1−f)+ φαf]
[2φ(1−f)+ 1α (1+φ2)f][f+φα(1−f)]
[2φf+α(1+φ2)(1−f)][(1−f)+ φαf]
[φf + α(1− f)]
[
σ
µ
− f
f+φα(1−f)
]
+ φf
5.2.5 Long-run equilibrium
In the short-run equilibrium, real wages are determined by taking as given the amount of
skilled workers in each region. The long-run equilibrium is a situation in which, in addition,
workers do not wish to migrate. The long-run equilibrium is stable if it is robust to small
perturbations of the distribution of workers across regions.
Dispersion is a long-run equilibrium configuration where 0 < f ∗ < 1 and regions offer the
same real wage. It is stable if a small migration to region i decreases the real wage in region
i, implying that the initial configuration is reestablished. Formally:
f ∗ ∈ (0, 1), ω1
ω2
|f=f∗ and (for stability) ∂(ω1/ω2)
∂f
∣∣∣∣
f=f∗
< 0
If the equilibrium share of population in region 1 is f ∗ = 0.5, we say that dispersion is
symmetric. Otherwise, it is asymmetric.
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Concentration is a long-run equilibrium configuration where all skilled workers are
concentrated in the region that offers the highest real wage. Concentration in region 1
and in region 2 satisfies, respectively:
f ∗ = 1, ω1 ≥ ω2 and (for stability) ∃ > 0 : 1−  < f < 1⇒ ω1 ≥ ω2,
f ∗ = 0, ω1 ≤ ω2 and (for stability) ∃ > 0 : 0 < f < ⇒ ω1 ≤ ω2.
5.3 Results
We consider two distinct situations: (1) symmetric fixed costs, and (2) asymmetric fixed
costs.
5.3.1 Symmetric fixed costs
Proposition 5.3.1. When the number of skilled workers is the same in each region (M1 =
M2), and regions have equal fixed costs, that is α = 1, the real wages are the same in each
region.
Proof. When α = 1 and M1 = M2, expression (5.14) becomes:
ω1
ω2
=
(φM1 +M1)
(
σ
µ
− M1
M1+φM1
)
+ φM1
[2φM1+(1+φ2)M1](M1+φM1)
[2φM1+(1+φ2)M1](M1+φM1)
[2φM1+(1+φ2)M1](M1+φM1)
[2φM1+(1+φ2)M1](M1+φM1)
(φM1 +M1)
(
σ
µ
− M1
M1+φM2
)
+ φM1
× (M1 + φM1)
µ
1−σ
(M1 + φM1)
µ
1−σ
⇔
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ω1
ω2
=
(φM1 +M1)
(
σ
µ
− M1
M1+φM1
)
+ φM1
(φM1 +M1)
(
σ
µ
− M1
M1+φM2
)
+ φM1
= 1
This means that symmetric dispersion is an equilibrium for identical fixed costs. This is the
case in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
5.3.2 Asymmetric fixed costs
In this section we study how a technology advantage affects the location of industrial
activity. The technology advantage is modelled by having a region in which all industrial
firms have lower fixed costs.
Figure 5.14 illustrates how a decrease in the fixed costs in region 1, relatively to those in
region 2, affects the location of industrial activity. The bold line describes the case in which
α = 1, while the dotted line illustrates a situation in which α = 0.8.
We can see from figure 5.1 that a decrease in α, increases the relative real wage of the
skilled workers in region 1 (in the short-run, the economy moves from point Eo to E1). In
the long-run, there will be asymmetric dispersion, as region 1 will have more workers than
region 2 (point E2).
According to proposition 5.3.2, and considering as a starting point a symmetric dispersion
equilibrium in which α = 1 and fm = 0.5, this outcome occurs for any value of φ ∈ (0, 1),
µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
4To plot this figure, we have set τ = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 3.
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Figure 5.1: Asymmetric dispersion.
Proposition 5.3.2. When the number of skilled workers is the same in each region (M1 =
M2), and the fixed costs in region 1 are lower than in region 2, that is α < 1, then the real
wages in region 1 are higher than in region 2, for any value of φ ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
Figure 5.25 reveals an interesting result. When a technology advantage is sufficiently high,
all industrial activity is concentrated in a single region. For instance, suppose that region
1 obtains a technology advantage (α = 0.6). We can see from figure 5.2 an equilibrium
configuration in which all industrial activity is concentrated in region 1 (point E2).
According to proposition 5.3.3, concentration is an equilibrium in region 1 when α1
α2
is lower
than a critical value, that is α1
α2
≤ α∗. And according to proposition 5.3.4, concentration is
an equilibrium in region 2 when α2
α1
≤ α∗.
Proposition 5.3.3. Concentration of all industrial activity in region 1 is an equilibrium
when α1
α2
≤ α∗, with α∗ = 2φ
µ
1−σ+1
φ2(1+µσ )+1−µσ
.
5To plot this figure, we have set τ = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 3.
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Figure 5.2: Concentration.
Proposition 5.3.4. Concentration of all industrial activity in region 2 is an equilibrium
when α2
α1
≤ α∗ with α∗ = 2φ
µ
1−σ+1
φ2(1+µσ )+1−µσ
.
It is straightforward that when α∗ < 1, concentration only occurs in the region with the
lowest fixed cost. But in the case in which, α∗ > 1, if there is concentration in the region
with the highest fixed cost, then concentration may also occur in the other region.
Another interesting issue is the effectiveness of the technology advantage in attracting
industrial activity when φ has different values.
Figure 5.36 illustrates a case in which for a given technology advantage in region 1,
α = 0.75, an increase in τ from τ = 0.5 to τ = 0.75 changes the spatial distribution of
the economic activity. The economy moves from point E0 (asymmetric dispersion) to point
E1, where all industrial activity is concentrated in region 1. Thus, a technology advantage
is more effective in attracting industrial activity when economic integration is high.
According to proposition 5.3.5, an increase in φ increases the critical value α∗. Therefore,
6To plot this figure, we have set α = 0.75, µ = 0.4, σ = 3.
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Figure 5.3: Asymmetric dispersion.
for low economic integration (or low φ), only a high technology advantage generates an
equilibrium configuration in which all industrial activity is concentrated in a region. But,
for high economic integration, a small technology advantage is sufficient to produce the
same outcome (concentration).
Proposition 5.3.5. The critical point α∗ = 2φ
µ
1−σ+1
φ2(1+µσ )+1−µσ
is an increasing function of φ.
We also study how a technology advantage affects the welfare of the population in region 1
and region 2. For this, we assume f = 0.5, so that there are as many workers in region 1 as
in region 2. The technology advantage is obtained in two ways: (i) a decrease in the home
fixed costs; (ii) an increase in the foreign fixed costs.
We suppose that region 1 obtains an technology advantage. Figure 5.47 illustrates a case
in which region 1 decreases the fixed costs from 1 to 0.8. We can see that a fall in α1,
ceteris paribus, raises the welfare of the skilled workers in region 1. Figure 5.5 illustrates
a situation in which technology advantage in region 1 is obtained by an increase in the
7To plot figures 5.4 and 5.5 we have used τ = 0.5, µ = 0.4 and σ = 3.
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Figure 5.4: Welfare in region 1 with a
decrease in α1.
Figure 5.5: Welfare in region 1 with an
increase in α2.
fixed costs of region 2. Even in this case, the welfare of the skilled workers in region 1 is
improved.
Figure 5.6 and 5.78 illustrate how a technology advantage in region 1 affects the welfare
of the skilled workers in region 2. We can see from figure 5.6, that a fall in α1, raises
the welfare of the skilled workers in region 2. On the other hand, figure 5.7 illustrates a
situation in which a technology advantage in region 1 is obtained by an increase in the fixed
costs of region 2. In this case, skilled workers in region 2 are worse off.
We conclude that if a technology advantage does not imply an increase in the foreign fixed
costs, skilled workers in both regions are better off when fm = 0.5.
Unskilled workers are another group in the economy. They are immobile between regions
and their welfare only depends on the price index of the region where they live. In the
next figures9, we study how a technology advantage in region 1 affects the welfare of the
unskilled workers in both regions.
8To plot these figures we have chosen τ = 0.5, µ = 0.4 and σ = 3
9To plot the following figures we have chosen τ = 0.5, µ = 0.4 and σ = 3
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Figure 5.6: Welfare in region 2 with a
decrease in α1.
Figure 5.7: Welfare in region 2 with an
increase in α2.
We can see from figure 5.8 that a fall, ceteris paribus, in the fixed cost of the region 1,
α1, increases the real wages of the unskilled workers in that region, whereas, a rise in the
foreign fixed cost (α2) decreases the real wages of the unskilled workers in region 1 (figure
5.9).
Doing the same analysis for region 2, figure 5.10 illustrates that a decrease in the fixed
cost in region 1, (α1) increases the real wages of the unskilled workers in region 2, but an
increase in the fixed cost in region 2 decreases the real wages in that region.
We conclude that a technology advantage in a region increases the welfare of the unskilled
workers in both regions if there is a fall in one of the fixed costs. We also conclude, that a
technology advantage obtained by a rise in the foreign fixed costs worsens the welfare of
the unskilled workers in both regions.
We formulate the following proposition expressing the relation between the fixed costs and
the welfare (or the real wages) of the unskilled workers.
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Figure 5.8: The welfare of the unskilled
workers in region 1 when α1 decreases.
Figure 5.9: The welfare of the unskilled
workers in region 1 when α2 increases.
Figure 5.10: The welfare of the unskilled
workers in region 2 when α1 decreases.
Figure 5.11: The welfare of the unskilled
workers in region 2 when α2 increases.
Proposition 5.3.6. The real wage of the unskilled workers in region i is a decreasing
function of αi and αj for any φ ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
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5.4 Concluding remarks
We have extended the footloose entrepreneur model (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003) including
a technology advantage for all industrial firms operating in one of the regions. The
technology advantage is modelled by having a region in which all industrial firms have
lower fixed costs.
We find that industrial activity in a region is enhanced, ceteris paribus, by lower home fixed
costs and by higher foreign fixed costs. We also find that a technology advantage is more
effective in attracting industrial activity when economic integration is high.
From the point of view of welfare, we conclude that all skilled workers in a region are better
off if the home (foreign) fixed costs decreases (increases). But, if a technology advantage
does not imply an increase in the foreign fixed costs, skilled workers in both regions are
better off.
Relatively to the welfare of the unskilled workers, we conclude that a technology advantage
in a region increases the welfare of the unskilled workers in both regions if there is a fall in
one of the fixed costs. But, a technology advantage obtained by a rise in the foreign fixed
costs worsens the welfare in both regions.
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Mathematical proofs
C.1 Short-run equilibrium
Equations (5.9), (5.10), (5.11), (5.12) and (5.13) determine the short-run equilibrium of the model.
We recall these equations here.
W1 =
µ
σ
(
Y1
M1 + φαM2
+
φY2
φM1 + αM2
)
,
W2 =
µ
σ
(
Y2
M2 +
φ
αM1
+
φY1
φM2 +
1
αM1
)
,
Y1 =
L
2
+W1M1,
Y2 =
L
2
+W2M2,
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P1 =
βσ
σ − 1
(
1
α1
) µ
1−σ
(M1 + φαM2)
µ
1−σ ,
P2 =
βσ
σ − 1
(
1
α2
) µ
1−σ
(
M2 +
φ
α
M1
) µ
1−σ
.
Substituting Y1 and Y2 int W1 and W2, we obtain:
W1 =
µ
σ
(
L
2 +W1M1
M1 + φαM2
+
φ
(
L
2 +W2M2
)
φM1 + αM2
)
,
and
WM2 =
µ
σ
(
L
2 +W2M2
M2 +
φ
αM1
+
φ
(
L
2 +W1M1
)
φM2 +
1
αM1
)
.
By convenience, we denote:
a =
L
2
,
b1 = φM1 + αM2,
c1 = M1 + φαM2,
b2 = φM2 +
1
α
M1,
c2 = M2 +
φ
α
M1.
Using this notation, the above expressions become:
W1 =
µ
σ
(
a+W1M1
c1
+
φ (a+W2M2)
b1
)
,
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and
W2 =
µ
σ
(
a+W2M2
c2
+
φ (a+W1M1)
b2
)
.
After some algebra, we obtain:
W1
(
σ
µ
− M1
c1
)
=
a
c1
+
φa
b1
+
φ
b1
M2W2 (C.1)
and
W2
(
σ
µ
− M2
c2
)
=
a
c2
+
φa
b2
+
φ
b2
M1W1. (C.2)
Substituting (C.2) into (C.1), we obtain:
W1
σ
µ
− M1
c1
− φ
2M2M1
b1b2
(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
 = a
c1
+
φa
b1
+
φaM2
b1c2
(
σ
µ − M2c2
) + φ2aM2
b1b2
(
σ
µ − M2c2
) .
Substituting (C.1) into (C.2), we obtain:
W2
σ
µ
− M2
c2
− φ
2M1M2
b2b1
(
σ
µ − M1c1
)
 = a
c2
+
φa
b2
+
φaM1
b2c1
(
σ
µ − M1c1
) + φ2aM1
b2b1
(
σ
µ − M1c1
) .
After some manipulation, we have that:
W1 =
 b1b2
(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
(
σ
µ − M2c2
)(
σ
µ − M1c1
)
b1b2 − φM2M1
×
×
 a
c1
+
φa
b1
+
φaM2
b1c2
(
σ
µ − M2c2
) + φ2aM2
b1b2
(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
 ,
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and
W2 =
 b2b1
(
σ
µ − M1c1
)
(
σ
µ − M1c1
)(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
b2b1 − φM1M2
×
×
 a
c2
+
φa
b2
+
φaM1
b2c1
(
σ
µ − M1c1
) + φ2aM1
b2b1
(
σ
µ − M1c1
)
 .
Since there is a common term, the above equations become:
W1 =
H
b1
ab1
(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
c1
+
(
σ
µ
− M2
c2
)
φa+
φaM2
c2
+
φ2aM2
b2
 ,
and
W2 =
H
b2
ab2
(
σ
µ − M1c1
)
c2
+
(
σ
µ
− M1
c1
)
φa+
φaM1
c1
+
φ2aM1
b1
 ,
with
H =
b2b1(
σ
µ − M1c1
)(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
b2b1 − φM1M2
.
After some algebra, the nominal wages of the skilled workers in region 1 and 2 are:
W1 =
H
b1
a
(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
(b1 + φc1)
c1
+
φM2a (b2 + φc2)
c2b2

and
W2 =
H
b2
a
(
σ
µ − M1c1
)
(b2 + φc2)
c2
+
φM1a (b1 + φc1)
c1b1
 .
The ratio of the real wages is:
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ω1
ω2
=
W1
P1
W2
P2
= α
µ
1−σ
W1
W2
(
M2 +
φ
αM1
) µ
1−σ
(M1 + φαM2)
µ
1−σ
, (C.3)
where:
W1
W2
=
c2b2
(
σ
µ − M2c2
)
(b1 + φc1) + φ (b2 + φc2) c1M2
c1b1
(
σ
µ − M1c1
)
(b2 + φc2) + φ (b1 + φc1) c2M1
⇔
W1
W2
=
(
φM2 +
1
αM1
)(
σ
µ − M2M2+ φαM1
)
+ φM2
[2φM2+ 1α(1+φ
2)M1](M1+αφM2)
[2φM1+α(1+φ2)M2](M2+ φαM1)
[2φM2+ 1α (1+φ2)M1](M1+φαM2)
[2φM1+α(1+φ2)M2](M2+ φαM1)
(φM1 + αM2)
(
σ
µ − M1M1+φαM2
)
+ φM1
.
Defining the share of the skilled workers in region 1 by f = M1M1+M2 , the above equation becomes:
ω1
ω2
= α
µ
1−σ
[
(1− f) + φαf
] µ
1−σ
[f + φα(1− f)] µ1−σ
×
×
[
φ(1− f) + 1αf
] [
σ
µ − (1−f)(1−f)+ φ
α
f
]
+ φ(1− f) [2φ(1−f)+
1
α(1+φ
2)f][f+αφ(1−f)]
[2φf+α(1+φ2)(1−f)][(1−f)+ φαf]
[2φ(1−f)+ 1α (1+φ2)f][f+φα(1−f)]
[2φf+α(1+φ2)(1−f)][(1−f)+ φαf]
[φf + α(1− f)]
[
σ
µ − ff+φα(1−f)
]
+ φf
.
C.2 Proof of propositions
C.2.1 Proposition 5.4.2
Proof. We want to prove that ω1ω2 > 1, when M1 = M2 and α < 1. From (C.3), we have that:
ω1
ω2
=
W1
W2
P2
P1
.
It is sufficient to show that both W1W2 and
P2
P1
are bigger than 1.
143
APPENDIX C. MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
First, we show that P2P1 > 1. Notice that for M1 = M2:
P2
P1
= α
µ
1−σ
(
M1 +
φ
αM1
) µ
1−σ
(M1 + φαM1)
µ
1−σ
⇔
P2
P1
=
(
αM1 + φM1
M1 + φαM1
) µ
1−σ
=
(
α+ φ
1 + αφ
) µ
1−σ
.
For P2P1 to be bigger than 1 we must have
α+φ
1+αφ < 1. This occurs for:
α+ φ < 1 + αφ⇔ (1− φ)α < 1− φ⇔ α < 1 and φ < 1.
Second, we show that W1W2 > 1 when α < 1.
Notice that for M1 = M2:
W1
W2
=
(
φM1 +
1
αM1
)(
σ
µ − M1M1+ φαM1
)
+ φM1
[2φM1+ 1α(1+φ
2)M1](M1+αφM1)
[2φM1+α(1+φ2)M1](M1+ φαM1)
[2φM1+ 1α (1+φ2)M1](M1+φαM1)
[2φM1+α(1+φ2)M1](M1+ φαM1)
(φM1 + αM1)
(
σ
µ − M1M1+φαM1
)
+ φM1
⇔
W1
W2
=
(
φM1 +
1
αM1
)(
σ
µ − M1M1+ φαM1
)
+ φM1A
A (φM1 + αM1)
(
σ
µ − M1M1+φαM1
)
+ φM1
where:
A =
[
2φM1 +
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)
M1
]
(M1 + αφM1)
[2φM1 + α (1 + φ2)M1]
(
M1 +
φ
αM1
) .
Observe that W1W2 > 1 since:(
φM1 +
1
α
M1
)(
σ
µ
− M1
M1 +
φ
αM1
)
+ φM1A >
A (φM1 + αM1)
(
σ
µ
− M1
M1 + φαM1
)
+ φM1 ⇔
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⇔
(
φM1 +
1
α
M1
)(
σ
µ
− M1
M1 +
φ
αM1
)
− A (φM1 + αM1)
(
σ
µ
− M1
M1 + φαM1
)
+ φM1(A− 1) > 0.
It is clear that above condition is satisfied if:
• A =
[
2φM1 +
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)
M1
]
(M1 + αφM1)
[2φM1 + α (1 + φ2)M1]
(
M1 +
φ
αM1
) > 1.
• φM1 +
1
αM1
φM1 + αM1
> A.
Concerning the first item, we have that:[
2φM1 +
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)
M1
]
(M1 + αφM1)
[2φM1 + α (1 + φ2)M1]
(
M1 +
φ
αM1
) > 1⇔
⇔ 2φ2M21 + 2φ2αM21 +
1
α
(1 + φ2)M21 + (1 + φ
2)M21φ >
2φ2M21 +
1
α
2φ2M21 + α(1 + φ
2)M21 + (1 + φ
2)M21φ⇔
⇔ 2φ2αM21 −
1
α
2φ2M21 > α(1 + φ
2)M21 −
1
α
(1 + φ2)M21 ⇔
⇔ 2φ2M21
(
α− 1
α
)
> (1 + φ2)M21
(
α− 1
α
)
⇔ M21
(
α− 1
α
)(
φ2 − 1) > 0.
We conclude that this condition is verified if α < 1.
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Concerning the second condition, we have that:
φM1 +
1
αM1
φM1 + αM1
>
[
2φM1 +
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)
M1
]
(M1 + αφM1)
[2φM1 + α (1 + φ2)M1]
(
M1 +
φ
αM1
) ⇔
⇔ φ+
1
α
φ+ α
>
[
2φ+ 1α
(
1 + φ2
)]
(1 + αφ)
[2φ+ α (1 + φ2)]
(
1 + φα
) ⇔
⇔
(
φ+ 1α
) (
1 + φα
)
(φ+ α) (1 + αφ)
>
[
2φ+ 1α
(
1 + φ2
)]
[2φ+ α (1 + φ2)]
.
By convenience above condition is rewritten as:
A
B
>
C
D
.
It is satisfied if:
A > C ⇔
(
φ+
1
α
)(
1 +
φ
α
)
>
[
2φ+
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)]
and
B < D ⇔ (φ+ α) (1 + αφ) < [2φ+ α (1 + φ2)] .
Notice that:
A > C ⇔
⇔ φ+ φ
2
α
+
1
α
+
φ
α2
>
[
2φ+
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)]⇔
⇔ φ
(
1 +
1
α2
)
+
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)
> 2φ+
1
α
(
1 + φ2
)⇔
⇔ 1 + 1
α2
> 2⇔ α2 < 1.
146
C.2. PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS
Observe that:
B < D ⇔
φ+ αφ2 + α+ α2φ < 2φ+ α(1 + φ2)⇔
⇔ φ+ α2φ+ α (1 + φ2) < 2φ+ α(1 + φ2)⇔
⇔ φ (1 + α2) < 2φ⇔ α2 < 1.
We conclude that W1W2 > 1 since α < 1, and we finish the proof.
C.2.2 Proposition 5.4.3
Proof. Recall that α = α1α2 .
When f = 1, the ratio between the real wages becomes:
ω1
ω2
= α
µ
1−σ
(
φ
α
) µ
1−σ 1α
σ
µ
1
α
(1+φ2)φ
(
σ
µ
−1
)
2φ2
α
+ φ
=
2φ
µ
1−σ+2 σ
αµ
(1 + φ2)φ
(
σ
µ − 1
)
+ 2φ3
=
=
2φ
µ
1−σ+1 σ
αµ
(1 + φ2)
(
σ
µ − 1
)
+ 2φ2
.
Concentration is an equilibrium in region 1 if ω1 ≥ ω2, that is:
2φ
µ
1−σ+1
σ
αµ
≥ (1 + φ2)(σ
µ
− 1
)
+ 2φ2 ⇔
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⇔ α1
α2
≤ 2φ
µ
1−σ+1
φ2
(
1 + µσ
)
+ 1− µσ
.
C.2.3 Proposition 5.4.4
Proof. Recall that α = α1α2 .
When f = 0, the ratio between the real wages becomes:
ω1
ω2
=
(
1
φ
) µ
1−σ φ
(
σ
µ − 1
)
+ φ 2φ
2
(1+φ2)
2φ2
(1+φ2)
ασ
µ
=
(
1 + φ2
) (
σ
µ − 1
)
+ 2φ2
2φ
µ
1−σ+1 ασ
µ
.
Concentration of all industrial activity in region 2 is an equilibrium if ω1 ≤ ω2:
(
1 + φ2
)(σ
µ
− 1
)
+ 2φ2 ≤ 2φ µ1−σ+1ασ
µ
⇔ α ≥
(
1 + φ2
) (
σ
µ − 1
)
+ 2φ2
2φ
µ
1−σ+1 σ
µ
⇔
⇔ α ≥
φ2
(
σ
µ + 1
)
+ σµ − 1
2φ
µ
1−σ+1 σ
µ
⇔ α ≥ φ
2
(
1 + µσ
)
+ 1− µσ
2φ
µ
1−σ+1
⇔
⇔ 1α1
α2
≤ 2φ
µ
1−σ+1
φ2
(
1 + µσ
)
+ 1− µσ
⇔ α2
α1
≤ 2φ
µ
1−σ+1
φ2
(
1 + µσ
)
+ 1− µσ
.
C.2.4 Proposition 5.4.5
Proof. We want to prove that ∂α∂φ > 0.
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Notice that:
∂α
∂φ
> 0⇔
∂
∂φ
(
2φ
µ
1−σ+1
) [
φ2
(
1 + µσ
)
+ 1− µσ
]− ∂∂φ [φ2 (1 + µσ)+ 1− µσ ] 2φ µ1−σ+1[
φ2
(
1 + µσ
)
+ 1− µσ
]2 > 0.
Since the numerator is positive, the above condition is satisfied if:
2
(
µ
1− σ + 1
)
φ
µ
1−σ
[
φ2
(
1 +
µ
σ
)
+ 1− µ
σ
]
− 2φ
(
1 +
µ
σ
)
2φ
µ
1−σ+1 > 0⇔
⇔ 2φ µ1−σ
{(
µ
1− σ + 1
)[
φ2
(
1 +
µ
σ
)
+ 1− µ
σ
]
− 2φ2
(
1 +
µ
σ
)}
> 0.
Since 2φ
µ
1−σ is positive, the above condition is satisfied if:
φ2
(
1 +
µ
σ
)( µ
1− σ − 1
)
+
(
µ
1− σ + 1
)(
1− µ
σ
)
> 0⇔
⇔ φ <
√√√√√
(
µ
1−σ + 1
) (µ
σ − 1
)
(
1 + µσ
) ( µ
1−σ − 1
) .
Observe that condition is satisfied if the square root is higher than 1, that is:(
µ
1− σ + 1
)(µ
σ
− 1
)
>
(
1 +
µ
σ
)( µ
1− σ − 1
)
⇔ µ
σ
>
µ
1− σ .
Since the right-hand side is negative, we finish the proof.
C.2.5 Proposition 5.4.6
Proof. The real wage of an unskilled worker in region 1 is:
ωL1 =
WL1
P1
.
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We want to prove that dω
L
1
dα1
< 0 and dω
L
1
dα2
< 0:
∂ωL1
∂α1
=
1
P 21
(
∂WL1
∂α1
P1 − ∂P1
∂α1
WL1
)
.
and
∂ωL1
∂α2
=
1
P 21
(
∂WL1
∂α2
P1 − ∂P1
∂α2
WL1
)
.
Since WL1 = 1, above expressions become:
∂ωL1
∂α1
= − 1
P 21
∂P1
∂α1
and
∂ωL1
∂α2
= − 1
P 21
∂P1
dα2
.
We have:
∂P1
∂α1
=
µ
1− σ
βσ
σ − 1
(
M1
α1
+
φ
α2
M2
) µ
1−σ−1(
−M1
α21
)
> 0
and
∂P1
∂α2
=
µ
1− σ
βσ
σ − 1
(
M1
α1
+
φ
α2
M2
) µ
1−σ−1(
−φM2
α22
)
> 0
and the results follows.
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